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This paper explores the role of the media in the production of Korean nationality during the 2002 
World Cup. It suggests that the media coverage helped organise a spectacle of consumption, 
which became the primary means by which Korean nationality was articulated and understood. 
This study brings together research in media and Korean studies and aims to contribute to a timely 
understanding of nationality that recognises both its intimate connection with media and 
consumer culture and its normative and taxonomic function. 
 
The study elaborates a hybrid theoretical framework of a ‘system of signs’, which draws from 
Michel Foucault’s analysis of power and normalisation and the ideas of spectacle and simulacrum 
by Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard. The study examines two key cases of nationality production. 
Firstly, the ‘Red Devils’ and millions of street supporters that celebrated Korean victories were 
appropriated by the media to produce internally oriented affirmations of Korean identity and 
values that doubled as an entertainment spectacle. Secondly, the cult of admiration around the 
foreign manager Hiddink demonstrated how discourses of globalisation contribute to a social 
imaginary of global nationalities that compelled Koreans to judge their own nationality against the 
standards of the sŏnjin’guk (‘advanced nations’). 
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1. The Productive Conditions of Nationality 
 
On the 2nd of July, 2002, over one hundred and fifty thousand Koreans took to the streets in 
celebration. The 2002 World Cup, jointly hosted by South Korea and Japan, had just concluded. 
The unprecedented success of the Korean football team in the tournament, as well as the 
remarkable level of enthusiasm demonstrated by the public, had helped create a general 
impression of a highly successful tournament. In response, the Korean government had declared a 
one-off public holiday, and its World Cup and football bodies had hosted nationwide festivities to 
celebrate the successful hosting of the mega-event. In an unusual maneuver, the three major 
Korean broadcasters, both publicly and privately owned, collaborated to offer joint coverage of the 
parades and shows around the country. It was the final hurrah of a pervasive environment of 
national celebration that had dominated the public sphere for at least the past month. 
 
The participants of this festival were densely packed into a crowded mob. An overwhelming 
number sported ‘Be the Reds’ t-shirts, a football supporter’s kit that had quickly become a visual 
signifier of Korean nationality. Many had turned up hours earlier to guarantee a good view of the 
proceedings, but it was implicitly recognised that the ‘ideal’ way to experience this festival was not 
so much to watch the various celebrations as to simply be present, to declare one’s passionate 
attachment to Korean nationality, and witness its collective manifestation through the crowd.  
Such an attitude had been cultivated through a newly emergent practice of ‘street support’, where 
millions of Koreans had formed crowds such as this one to watch and celebrate the seven football 
matches played by the Korean team during the World Cup. Emboldened by the media’s active 
endorsement of street support as a patriotic activity and an evolution of Korean nationality, many 
had come to understand their participation in such celebrations as a productive activity that would 
contribute to a positive transformation of themselves as Koreans and the nation as a whole. The 
cheering mass of red on the 2nd of July was the visible manifestation of powerful discourses of 
national pride and transformation, discourses that had owed much of their pervasiveness and 
influence to the media. 
 
Throughout the day, this crowd was treated to a series of shows and performances that both 
entertained them and contributed to this national feeling. Flanked by traditional Korean sculptures, 
the Korean football team emerged in suits to greet the crowd and kick signed balls already placed 
at their feet.  An orderly procession of selected supporters laid elaborate wreaths on the players, 
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who were then guided into decorated open cars and paraded through the waiting crowd. At the 
same time, crowds elsewhere were entertained by musical and dance performances, split 
between the most popular pop artists of the day and performing troupes for traditional Korean 
song and dance. When the parade reached the kwanghwamun, a gate with an iconic status as a 
symbol of Korean history and culture, they were announced by a series of traditional Korean 
artistic performances and several giant Korean flags. As day passed into night, Kim Dae-Jung, the 
president of Korea, made an appearance to present each player with a medal and badge of honour, 
and give a short speech on the positive impact the World Cup would have on Korea’s ‘national 
development’. Finally, all the guests of the day took to the stage amidst fireworks and chants of 
tae-han-min-guk
1
: the President, the players in their suits, the traditional performers with their 
colourful traditional dress and instruments, the pop artists in their revealing outfits. Every stage of 
the day-long festival was designed to combine the appeal of the festival as an entertaining 
spectacle with the discourses and symbols of national pride and transformation. The experience of 
the festival as a whole was in the form of an environment of spectacle, wherein the visual 
signifiers of Korean nationality and discourses of national celebration were presented and 
consumed through familiar commodities of celebrity exposure, concerts and, for those watching 
from home, media texts.  
 
Yet this government-sponsored festival was not the apex of public enthusiasm and national 
celebration during this period; rather, it was an echo of a month-long festival during the World 
Cup, which had occurred nearly entirely without state intervention. The number of participants 
and the level of public enthusiasm on the 2
nd
 of July, while substantial, paled in comparison to the 
millions of frenzied ‘street supporters’ that had dominated the headlines during the World Cup. In 
fact, during the tournament itself, government-sponsored events and festivals had been 
consistently ignored by the public in favour of street supporting, ‘spontaneous’ gatherings 
encouraged by the media.
2
 It was through the allure of an impressive array of high profile pop 
stars and the Korean football team that the 2
nd
 of July festival became attractive. Far from taking a 
leading role in using this mega-event to focus on and promote Korean nationality, as it had 
intended before the tournament
3
, the government was relegated to a position where they had to 
do their best to align themselves with newly emerging practices of national celebration and 
discourses of nationality. The kungmindaech’ukche (‘big national festival’), as it was called, had 
shown that it was the media who took on this leading role. The operations of the Korean media 
                                           
1
 Literally translating to “The Great Nation of Korean Peoples”, it is the full and official name of South Korea, 
though a shortened version (‘han’guk’) is often used. The use of the term in the chant signified, generally 
speaking, an empowering proclamation of national glory and patriotism. 
2
 G. H. Joo (2002) p182 
3
 Y. G. Ha (2002) p3, 47 and J. Horne & W. Manzenreiter (2002) pp11-13 
T h e  P r o d u c t i v e  C o n d i t i o n s  o f  N a t i o n a l i t y  | 6 
 
during the 2002 World Cup were central to the outburst of positive and all-encompassing 
discourses of Korean nationality that has since come to define the event for Koreans. Looking back 
at this event, we can identify an important characteristic of nationality in contemporary society: its 
subjection, to a lesser or greater extent, to the laws and logics of the commodity spectacle. 
 
 
The festival of the 2
nd
 of July and the events surrounding the 2002 World Cup illustrate the 
emergence of a new set of conditions for the production of nationality in recent years. This is 
closely tied to the advent of globalisation, widely recognised as one of the leading transformative 
factors in contemporary society. The rapid increase in the mobility of peoples, media, technology, 
money and ideas
4
 across national and geographical boundaries has now reached a point where 
much of the world lives with a persistent awareness of global flows. As a corollary, however, 
uncertainty now dominates attempts to understand the meaning of nationality, and its functions 
and forms of operation in the contemporary world.
5
 It is now generally accepted that globalisation 
will not mean the end of the nation-state, but the exact parameters of its ongoing development 
are far from clear. This thesis considers the logics that now drive the production and operation of 
nationality, and to some extent determine its form and effect. The purpose of such an inquiry is to 
understand not so much manifestations of nationality, but how they are being produced – if 
nationality is changing, what is happening to the ways in which it is produced?  Understanding 
nationality at its operative roots is key to realising the roles it can and should play for globalising 
societies. Through a case study of Korean media coverage during the 2002 World Cup, this thesis 
will analyse the terms and conditions that dictate the discursive production of contemporary 
nationality through the media. 
 
 
Understanding Nationality 
 
What exactly is meant by ‘nationality’? To think of a nation, and to identify things and people with 
a nation, does not just involve the geographical or administrative demarcation of a particular set 
of objects, but a constellation of ideas, symbols, norms and truths. Collectively held 
understandings of nationalities draw from a huge variety of sources, from the collective memory 
of historical events, such as the Korean recollection of Japanese rule, to aesthetic and ideological 
archetypes such as ‘football-loving Brazilians’ and ‘short and hot-tempered Italians’. In other 
words, a nationality is a collective imaginary of characteristics that is continually shaped and 
                                           
4
 A. Appadurai (2006) p589, J. Xavier Inda & R. Rosaldo (2008) pp4-5. 
5
 See: M. Sasaki (2006) p272 
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reshaped through discourse.  
 
Nationality implies a pervasive system of symbolic attribution - a rather different mode of 
conceptualisation from oft-used terms such as nationalism and national identity.
6
 The former 
carries political connotations, particularly reactionary ones, while the latter is often used in a more 
specific manner regarding the identities of individuals and groups in relation to a nation. 
Nationality is a broader term that recognises specific ideas such as national history, identity and 
pride as part of a constellation of signifiers and discourses. This concept allows an investigation 
into the productive processes of nationality as a whole. 
 
Nationality continues to be an extremely prominent and deep-seated force: it still constitutes a 
key area on which the social subjectivity of individuals is founded. This thesis considers two key 
functions that nationality performs in contemporary society. Firstly, nationality provides a 
taxonomic system by which categories and classifications can be made: it is a generally identifiable 
grid by which various elements can be sorted, defined and associated.
7
 Secondly, nationality is a 
site that conditions the production and dissemination of templates of normativity
8
, by which the 
Self and the Other can be identified. These functions can be understood through the deployment 
of Michel Foucault’s model of power relations. This enables an understanding of nationality’s 
productive role in formulating regimes of truths and norms, its disciplinary aspect in training 
citizens that internalise those regimes, and the crucial role discourse plays in enacting these power 
relations.  
 
These core characteristics have long been a feature of modern (post-Westphalian) nationality, and 
the phenomenon of globalisation has not fundamentally altered them. The change globalisation 
has precipitated lies in the ways in which nationality is now produced. Specifically, I suggest that as 
“our daily lives become more and more interwoven with, and penetrated by, influences and 
experiences that have their origins far away”
9
, the media has become the primary site for the 
production of nationality. Individuals, especially in the developed world, are now connected to a 
bewildering number of nationalities – in the form of peoples, ideas, consumer products, 
institutions and so forth – despite the fact that they may have no personal experience of them. In 
such a context, many people now operate through a combination of personal understandings of a 
few nationalities, and mediated impressions of a larger variety of nationalities. The media provide 
anecdotes, symbolic signifiers, statistics, ‘expert’ opinions and other elements that purport to 
                                           
6
 H. J. Lee & Y. H. Cho (2009) pp2-3 
7
 A similar definition is made in R. Giulianotti (1999) p32 regarding nationality in sport. 
8
 See: M. Foucault (1975 [1979]) pp178-180, M. Foucault (1973, 1974 [2006]) pp53-4 
9
 A. Tomlinson in M. Sasaki (2006) p279. Also see: A. Giddens in J. Xavier Inda & R. Rosaldo (2006) p11. 
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offer a more ‘complete’ picture of the scenes and contexts in which ‘the national’ is played out. In 
short, we inevitably rely on the media to aid in understanding that which is too big for us to see 
for ourselves: taking Anderson’s idea of the imagined nation to its extreme, the landscape of 
nationalities has become Baudrillard’s simulacrum, a collectively imagined and mediated sphere 
where media images seem more real and identifiable than reality itself.
10
 Even as nationality 
retains a ‘sacred’ allure, the media claims an ever greater hold on the conditions of its production. 
 
 
Nationality as a Media Spectacle 
 
If the media is now the central site for the discursive production of contemporary nationality, it 
stands to reason that the characteristics of media industries and media production will have a 
significant impact on the type of nationalities that are produced. One of the key consequences of 
this relationship between media and nationality is that we are now witnessing the production of 
spectacular nationality, or nationality that is structured and presented as an entertaining and 
commodified spectacle. 
 
This thesis conceptualises the spectacle as a pervasive environment of consumption in 
contemporary society, appropriating Guy Debord’s works on the society of the spectacle and Jean 
Baudrillard’s analysis of the image and simulacra in post-industrial societies. The spectacle is thus 
understood as “not a collection of images... [but] a social relationship between peoples that is 
mediated by images”.
11
 In other words, the spectacle is not to be defined by the images and 
commodities that constitute its material manifestations: it must be understood as a pervasive and 
totalising logic that privileges exchange value and seeks to extend the processes of 
commodification onto every arena of social activity, in turn establishing consumption of the image 
as the primary form of social existence.
12
 The logic of the spectacle reorganises and appropriates 
its subject material for the purposes of formulating aestheticised and fetishistic commodities. 
More generally, such processes are part of totalising structures wherein commodification and 
consumption of all things becomes rationalised and naturalised. It is by now well documented that 
the media have played a key role in the development of the spectacle, and that the commodity 
logic of the latter governs the production of the former.
13
 Therefore, it must be recognised that as 
nationality has become more and more intertwined with the media, it has become more and 
                                           
10
 J. Baudrillard (2001) pp148-9, p169-170, p179 and B. Anderson (1991) pp5-7. 
11
 G. Debord (1994) p12 
12
 G. Debord (1994) pp35-7, p46 and G. Debord (1988 [1990]) p9 
13
 G. Debord (1994) p12 and D. Kellner (2003) pp1-2 
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more spectacular.  We can now trace the outward manifestations of nationality in media discourse 
– be it articulations of stereotypes, or the framing of events through a national narrative – to a 
commodifying and spectacular logic. “Images chosen and constructed by someone else have 
everywhere become the individual’s principal connection to the world he formerly observed for 
himself”
14
; it is the mediated image of nationality that now performs the social functions of 
nationality. At the same time, the productive conditions of such an image demand that it perform 
the functions of a spectacular commodity, bringing together the spectacle and nationality in a 
single manifestation. 
 
At this point we return to the events of the 2
nd
 of July, and the Korean media coverage of the 2002 
World Cup as a whole.  As discussed above, the ‘big national festival’ on that day was not the 
crown jewel of a government-led, official celebration of Korea through the tournament, but an 
imitative echo of the media-led, spectacular festivals of consumption that the government sought 
to appropriate for its own purposes. Involving millions of ‘street supporters’, corporate 
advertisements and proclamations of national transformation, the 2002 World Cup was the site of 
a highly focused and explicit form of spectacular nationality that rearticulated ‘Korea’ through 
media discourse. This thesis will use the media production of Korean nationality during the 2002 
World Cup as a case study in order to investigate the operation of spectacular nationality. 
 
Such a case study follows on from a long-held recognition of sport’s significance as a cultural field 
in which a great deal of political and national interests is invested.
15
 The World Cup, as one of the 
most important contemporary global events, puts the relationship between sport and nationality 
into even sharper relief: it is an arena where discourses of nationality, and the mechanisms of 
nationality production, are unusually explicit and prominent. National teams continue to be seen 
as a microcosm of their nation, and the World Cup a proving ground for nationalities.
16
 Sport has 
also developed an extremely close relationship with the media, to the extent that the logic of the 
spectacle has directly influenced the rules by which sport is played, kinds of socio-cultural 
functions it has taken on, and the financial infrastructure that supports the field.
17
 In particular, 
Korea in 2002 presents a unique mix of a highly developed and sophisticated media industry, and a 
social climate in which unusually explicit forms of social engineering and ideological discourse 
became acceptable when regarding the question of nationality.  
 
To this end, this thesis takes the media discourses of nationality as its primary object of study.  As 
                                           
14
 G. Debord (1988 [1990]) p27 
15
 T. Schirato (2009) pp112-5 
16
 M. Roche (2000) p6, S. Perera (2001) p521 
17
 See: T. Schirato (2009) pp89-90, G. Crawford (2004) p81, J. Horne (2006) p42, 
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Foucault asserted, power is always at its most explicit, and most vulnerable, when it is enacted 
and brought into being: the use of discourse in media texts is the point at which the underlying 
logic of the spectacle is made manifest.
18
 The examination of discourse enables an analysis of 
nationality that does not concentrate on the current meaning of nationality, but rather how this 
meaning is continuously produced and reproduced. For this purpose, this thesis will undertake a 
case study of the Korean media coverage during the 2002 World Cup. The 2002 World Cup was an 
event that brought forth a highly explicit, deliberate and focused form of nationalistic discourse: it 
greatly exceeded the boundaries of its status as a sporting event, and became a site in which the 
media articulated what Korean nationality was and what it should strive to become. Furthermore, 
members of the Korean media simultaneously, and through the same discourse and texts, 
produced spectacular narratives and signifiers in order to capitalise on the commodity potential of 
the event.
19
 The media discourse involved a “simultaneous production of a communal identity 
and/as a commodity”, wherein Korean nationality was “simultaneously both inalienable culture 
and a commodity”
20
 and thus demonstrated the relationship between media, spectacle and 
contemporary nationality. This thesis analyses print and broadcast media in Korea between May 
and July 2002, and the media’s role as a productive mechanism of spectacular nationality. 
 
Chapter 2, ‘The System of Signs’, will introduce the theoretical framework of such an analysis. I use 
the model of the ‘system of signs’ to chart the process by which discourse manifests, challenges 
and reconsolidates relations of power through the medium of texts, producing sets of signs that 
are meaningful not only in their own signification, but through their relative positioning to other 
signs and the system as a whole. The systems of signs, of which nationality is but one, then 
present a normative taxonomy which subjectivises its audience to the same rules that constitute 
its own being. This general model of media power and discourse is then integrated with an 
adaptation of Guy Debord’s theories of the spectacle. This framework will then be applied to two 
specific media phenomena during the 2002 World Cup. Chapter 3 will examine the ‘Red Devils’ 
and the phenomenon of ‘street support’, which saw millions of Koreans take to the streets in a 
collective experience of spectatorship and solidarity. This was discursively produced as not only a 
defining image of the mega-event, but  a means by which Korean nationality could be positively 
redefined, validated, and inculcated. Chapter 4 will investigate the extraordinary level of 
idolisation of the Korean national team manager, Guus Hiddink. The specific characteristics of this 
‘Hiddink Syndrome’ were symptomatic of a discursive relationship between Korean nationality and 
other, ‘global’ nationalities; this relationship was in turn demonstrative of the crucial role that the 
                                           
18
 See: M. Foucault (1976 [1988]) p101, M. Foucault (1972 [1980]) p119. 
19
 See: J. Horne & W. Manzenreiter (2004) pp194-5, “consumer nationalism”. 
20
 T. Schirato (2007) p2 
T h e  P r o d u c t i v e  C o n d i t i o n s  o f  N a t i o n a l i t y  | 11 
 
the Other plays in the shaping of Korean nationality, whose subjects are made to adopt a ‘double-
sided gaze’ that constantly refers back to its own imaginary of the Other. Taken together, the two 
phenomena provide an understanding of the discursive conditions under which Korean nationality 
was produced at the time, and the forms through which the logic of the spectacle influenced the 
process. The case studies suggest the means by which an understanding of contemporary 
nationality can recognise the role of a spectacular and commoditised media industry in the age of 
globalisation. 
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2. The System of Signs 
 
The nature of the question posed in this thesis demands perspectives that do not sit easily within 
either traditional investigations of national identity, or debates regarding globalisation. These 
approaches often focus on the interaction between nationality and another object, such as 
national subjects or global influences, rather than the mechanisms that characterise and 
constitute manifestations of nationality. An examination of nationality’s influences and 
interactions is necessarily predicated on the idea of a nationality as an identifiable and stable 
referent, and leads to assumptions about its unity. On the other hand, rethinking nationality as a 
spectacular affair requires a critical analysis of its mechanical operations, such as the way it 
produces a sense of the sacred and solidarity. It also means that nationality should not be 
considered in an abstracted, ‘ideal’ form, or in terms of decline or distortion in the face of 
globalisation. In short, nationality needs to be analysed as a series of discursive regimes, sites and 
practices oriented towards an interpellative ideal. 
 
To this end, this thesis conceptualises nationality as a ‘system of signs’, best understood as an 
architectural constellation of signifiers that are produced through discourse, and operate to 
establish taxonomies of knowledge/truths that create social norms and subjects. This concept 
models the process where elements in media text invoke and mobilise discourses; these 
discourses have a productive and significative function, and in turn, formulate generalised systems 
of ideas and beliefs. It is a necessary demarcation of what is in reality a fluid and overlapping 
process of signification and meaning-making. Within such a framework, discourse is identified as 
the primary object of analysis where the ideas, signs and value systems that constitute nationality 
are produced. This means nationality can be understood not in terms of how ‘real’ or artificial it is, 
or why it might have occurred, but in terms of how it is working and what it is producing. This 
approach involves an adaptation of Michel Foucault’s models of power in the context of 
contemporary media, wherein power is recognised as an impersonal and compelling force, and 
discourse a key mechanism by which power is enacted. This theoretical basis is supplemented by 
the theories of the spectacle. Adapted from Guy Debord’s notion of the ‘society of the spectacle’, 
and integrating Jean Baudrillard’s discussions of signification and simulation, the spectacle is here 
understood as a ‘general logic’ that pervades the productive processes of the system of signs. 
Nationality is not analysed as a self-contained and inherent aspect that is then imposed on fields 
and texts to varying degrees of fidelity, but inversely, as a product of these discursive 
manifestations.  
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The primary objective of this model is to identify not so much the visual artefacts of texts or their 
eventual social consequence, but the processes and the mechanisms of textual production as a 
means of naturalising and deploying meanings. The specific content of Korean World Cup coverage, 
or the resulting ideas of Korean nationality, matter only insofar as they illuminate the patterns and 
techniques that are employed in the process. Ultimately, this perspective will enable an analysis of 
the normalising and subjectivising forces that are the gears and cogs of the visible phenomena of 
nationality. 
 
 
Text 
 
The integrity of the text and the author is a concept that has long been problematised. Since 
Roland Barthes wrote of the ‘death of the author’, theories of media audiences and fandom, 
especially in the internet age, have coined terms such as ‘prosumers’ and ‘active audiences’ to 
explain the ways in which the meaning of a text is increasingly determined by the audience and 
the contexts of production, as much as the intention of the creator. Yet true to the original point of 
Barthes’ argument, the death of the author does not mean the dissolution of the text: in the re-
location of meaning-making from the author to the process of communication itself, the ‘realness’ 
of the text becomes ever more important. The text, as a static, material artefact with visibly 
identifiable components, serves as a site for meaning-making and a common referent. Moreover, 
the mass media text, with its wide distribution network and high production values, still possesses 
a strong sense of legitimacy that sets it apart as a focal point for publicly influential discourse. The 
newspaper article, the television show, and prime time news – they are sites where the implicit 
workings of power are articulated and made possible.
21
 The text is where knowledge and power, 
or in fact knowledge as defined and shaped by power,
22
 is both visible and brought into being. 
 
The media text is therefore a site of the communication and production of knowledge. It is where 
things, whether a singular object (a person, an image, a word) or a composite element (a 
relationship, a structure, a format), are made into or renegotiated as signs in a way that imbues 
them with meaning. Of course, rarely, if ever, are things merely ‘things’ without any form of 
signification; it is the status, meaning and position of a thing in the symbolic order that determines 
the terms of its social existence. The text is a place for producing and reifying signs whose origins 
are never quite as certain as their current manifestation, and they come together to form a 
                                           
21
 M. Foucault (1988 [1976]), pp92-3 
22
 ibid., p119 
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general landscape of signification.  
 
During the 2002 World Cup, the Korean media performed this function actively and deliberately, 
flooding the country with textual content that was remarkable in its variety, quantity, intensity and 
prominence. Newspapers used serial features to build up anticipation before the event,
23
 and 
when the tournament began, they raised the bar by allowing every section of the publications to 
be dominated by World Cup stories, from sport and lifestyle to politics. The three major 
broadcasters were just as enthusiastic, dedicating a staggering 34 per cent of their schedule to 
World Cup content during the tournament.
24
 On days of Korean victories, prime time news 
programs opened with dramatic announcements of triumph, pushing all non-World Cup news 
aside to the last ten minutes. Each of these media texts communicated ideas, impressions and 
perspectives about the World Cup, Korean performance as a host and football team in the 
tournament, and Korean nationality as a whole. Moreover, these ideas were not simply pushed 
out as disparate, fractured pieces, but came together to form the aforementioned pattern of 
signification. There was a significant level of coordination and planning behind the World Cup 
coverage: broadcasters convened with each other and the government to formulate general 
strategies towards promoting Korean nationality, and individually moved to educate staff in 
football journalism and invest in overseas correspondents.
25
 By no means was there a singular and 
centralised will driving the coverage, but narratives, ideas and impressions across texts 
complemented each other and were consumed with regard to each other. Indeed, the stories in 
print and broadcast media at the time tended to have strong similarities across genres and 
publishers.
26
 When a celebrity program tracked down a Korean footballer at home and depicted 
him as an innocent, hard-working hero, that act of signification was consumed in relation to a 
pundit’s commentary on his performance during a World Cup match or a newspaper column’s 
discussions about Korean mentality in general. I suggest that the flood of Korean media coverage 
during the 2002 World Cup can be considered an amalgam of independent, but connected and 
complementary media texts whose singular and composite elements are produced as signs and 
imbued with meaning. These elements consist of the objects, structures, narratives and contexts 
of any given media text. 
 
                                           
23
 The Chosun-Ilbo ran its ‘gŭllobŏl etiket sidae’ (The Global Etiquette Age) series from 9 December 1998 to 
31 May 2002, where they identified areas in which Korean citizens needed to improve their manners. The 
Donga-Ilbo ran serial features ‘t’aegukjŏnsa’ (Taeguk Warrior) and ‘12pŏntchae sŏnsuga ttwinda’ (The 12
th
 
Player Runs) in April and May 2002, profiling the players in the Korean national team and the supporter 
cultures of other participating nations, respectively. 
24
 Y. G. Ha (2002), p75, 89, 90 
25
 ibid., pp63-4 
26
 C. M. Kang (2006), p247. 
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Objects are verbal or visual units that act as conduits for the association and production of 
impressions and emotions. In the case of Korea this could be the case with the colour red, both as 
one of the national colours and a symbol of the communist threat; reference to a shared memory, 
such as the military dictatorships between the 1950’s and 1980’s; the particular choice of language 
or accent; or the similarities to traditional Korean art in advertisement graphics. These objects are 
all iconic to varying extents, in that they are the most explicit and obvious form of meaning 
production. Crucially, objects are not units of self-contained meaning that are simply selected and 
arranged in texts, but fluid vessels that are able to be mobilised for a wide variety of possible 
significations, depending on the context and method of their representation. The media coverage 
of the 2002 World Cup showed how reports of the Red Devils and other supporters helped detach 
the colour red of its pre-existing connotations of communism and the word devil from its strong 
ties to Christianity. These objects were unmoored from their original contexts and reinvested into 
the symbolic order with new meanings and connotations, becoming symbols of a new generation 
of modern, democratic, individualistic and expressive Koreans. In this way, every appearance of an 
object in media text involves a redefining of its symbolic connotations, whether it reinforces 
existing meanings, subverts them or creates new ones.    
 
Narratives articulate and establish relationships between objects. They are often chronological, 
but not always so. Narratives therefore have the potential to position object-signs in relation to 
one another, producing associations, perspectives and familiarities. This positioning often involves 
variations of general types, which van Dijk calls ‘scripts’ and ‘models’: templates of syntax, 
situations and relationships that can be adapted to specific events and stories to produce 
narratives that we are familiar with and understand in particular, pre-set ways.
27
 The Korean media 
appeared to rely on such templates frequently during the World Cup period in order to deal with 
the journalistic challenges presented by the event. For instance, the introduction of the large 
number of participating countries was handled by employing familiar and generalised narratives, 
involving the reduction of specific nationalities into easily identifiable caricatures. The success of 
the Senegalese team was fitted into a familiar narrative of underdog triumphs, not strongly 
differentiated from coverage of other over-performing nations, or even from similar templates in 
fictional texts. This script also mobilised their French opponents into the role of the Goliath, 
completing the retelling of a familiar narrative in terms of real events. Narratives in Korean media 
texts were crucial for understanding the ways in which particular ideas or objects are positioned in 
relation to certain regimes of truth and normativity. 
 
Structures of the medium or genre as a whole can also be distinguished from structures of specific 
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narratives. These range from the ways in which close-ups are used to stitch together mini-
narratives in sport coverage, to the organisation of daily newspapers into sections that predispose 
certain types of stories each day. These structures themselves are imposed on the text through 
discourse that signals their appearance. Print news media, for instance, has developed its own 
syntax for headlines that immediately identify the text and position the reader: in English, the 
inverted declarative sentence structure is very frequently used to privilege the event or claim at 
hand over the veracity or source of that claim.
28
 While the Korean media makes use of similar 
techniques, a more pervasive convention is the use of compact, stylised ‘slogans’ that often 
employ poetic and/or conversational language. A Korean story about the Italian anger at the 
refereeing of a World Cup match was titled “’sŭngri dodukmatatda’ dŭlkkŭlnŭn italia” (‘We’ve 
been robbed’... rages Italy), while an article on fashion during the World Cup ran under the 
headline “’kaesŏngmanjŏm’ wŏldŭk’ŏp paeshŏn” (‘Full marks for individuality’ - World Cup 
fashion). In both cases, the compact slogans set the tone and perspective of the story using strong 
and direct language. Meanwhile, in television, the generic conventions governing program intros 
fulfil this role, such as the fast-paced, distinct visual style of sports program intros pioneered by 
Roone Arledge in his programs like Monday Night Football. Like narratives, it is their function to 
position objects in relation to each other and derive meaning from the constellation of object-
signs as a whole. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the context within which each text is produced. In other words, 
media texts invoke existing structural, symbolic and narrative elements from different texts and 
fields by identifying points of similarity or cross-reference. For instance, a football match between 
England and Germany can readily employ references to and the discourses of World War II, and 
leverage the pre-existing relationships of enmity to produce excitement.
29
 It was not uncommon 
for Korean newspapers to borrow from history to make sense of each nation’s performance in the 
World Cup, or appropriate the language and narratives of fields like war and celebrity culture to 
expand their range of stories. The effect was that the media coverage of the World Cup was not 
limited to the tournament as a sporting competition, but produced a collective imaginary of 
nationalities – a rich and expansive landscape that draw upon a huge variety of different contexts. 
The production of French nationality involved their startling failure on the football field as well as 
their love of wine and a general impression of sophistication.
30
 Dramatic documentaries drew 
upon evidence of civic responsibility and hospitality as well as personal stories of Korean football 
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players to flesh out narratives of Korean triumph and identify positive traits in Korean nationality. 
The mobilisation of contexts in this way allowed media texts to be both simple and complex: easy 
to grasp through various references, but containing a huge variety of implicitly communicated 
ideas and values. 
 
These four elements – objects, narratives, structures, context - are intimately connected aspects 
that reside in any media text. Their function is to present, or make manifest, stories, arguments 
and ideas in communicable form; at the same time, and inseparably, they work to produce 
structures of meaning that direct ways of understanding. This is where discourse comes into play, 
as the mechanism involved in the productive process of text.  
 
 
Discourse 
 
In media texts, speech and image are deployed in a regulated and normative manner to achieve 
the production of structures of meaning. Discourse refers to this process of how systems of value, 
norms and categories are embedded into the signs we recognise and the meanings we interpret. 
This production of the material, in terms of regimes of signification, occurs within a discursive 
matrix that derives value, legitimacy, truth and identity through the relative positioning of signs.
31
 
In short, discourse is the technique and the means by which production occurs. 
 
How does such a technique operate, and what characteristics does it possess? Above all, discourse 
is a regulated and public performance. The deployment of discourse is a public act intended to 
establish symbolic associations, whether it be identity with individual, signifier with signified, or a 
value or lack of value with an idea or ideology. The text acts as the material conduit and public site 
of this performance. The public nature of discourse gives it the capacity to affirm and legitimise 
the truths and power relations it expresses – at once both a declaration and a definition. This 
public and performative quality of discourse can be identified by the way it constantly addresses 
an imagined audience. Korean media are arguably more explicit in this than their Western 
counterparts; they frequently refer to the audience as ‘sichŏngja yŏrŏbun’ (literally, “all you 
viewers”), excusing their behaviour or presuming certain responses on the viewers’ behalf. 
Frequently, the audience is also inclusively interpellated as part of ‘urinara’ and ‘urinara saramdŭl’ 
(“our country” and “people of our country”). These techniques construct and position the 
imagined audience in such a way that a particular mode of reception is naturalised. Finally, while 
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discursive performance may at times appear theatrical or contrived, this does not always detract 
from its efficacy or legitimacy: within the context of mass media, there is an implicit 
understanding between producer and consumer that while the mode of expression is theatrical, 
the values and ideas underneath retain their truth value. 
 
Discursive performances are also codified and regulated: the spontaneous elements of speech are 
organised according to predefined expectations of what is said and how it is said
32
, taking the form 
of familiar rituals that reinforce both the aforementioned symbolic associations and the legitimacy 
of the discursive templates they invoke.
33
 This regularity means that discursive performances are 
constructed, maintained and perpetuated through a system of cumulative anticipation. Discourse 
is rarely random, but refers to social norms, categories and values, just as it redraws and 
perpetuates them. Therefore, they follow a regulated matrix that governs what to say, and when 
and how to say it – one of the primary functions of Foucaltian power and Bourdieu’s habitus.
34
 In 
effect, one always anticipates: there is an expectation for certain discursive performances, and 
appropriate responses or outcomes.
35
 It is this anticipation that can prompt formulaic responses, 
foreclosure of ideas, indignance at seemingly transgressive performances, and even confusion (or 
delight) at a violation of expectations. There is a matrix of discursive performances that governs 
how to ‘say/show’ and how to ‘listen/see’. 
    
The full extent of the regulations that govern discursive performance, and its legitimising and 
normalising function, is often masked from both the performer and the addressed. It is relatively 
easy to understand what is expected of one in a given situation, as this is already a part of the 
subject’s habitus. However, the question of what that knowledge legitimises and what power 
relations it affirms is much more obscure, since it is theoretically foreclosed. Thus it is through 
“this opacity of discourse… [that] people can be legitimising (or delegitimising) particular power 
relations without being conscious of doing so”.
36
 The media discourse during the 2002 World Cup, 
and ideas of Korea and Korean nationality it produced, were not so much the result of careful and 
conscious choreography on the part of media producers, but seemingly ‘natural’ consequences of 
the codified discourses they mobilised for media texts. 
 
Finally, discourse, despite its codified nature, is fluid and flexible in its manifestation. The 
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challenge in understanding the productive capacity of discourse is the ever-present potential for 
slippage. Regulating, foreclosing and legitimising discourse may be, but its public and explicit 
nature renders it contestable. Each utterance – a slip of the tongue, a faux pas, an inadequate 
performance – can expose these ‘rules of discourse’
37
 and the power relations immanent in 
them.
38
 What happens to the discourse of ‘quintessential’ British values of hard work and honesty, 
if the players on the screen then engage in foul play? Discourse derives its efficacy from its ability 
to adapt to such occasions. When the Korean team, managed by Guus Hiddink, succumbed to 
humiliating defeats in two high-profile matches, this did not erode the underlying belief that Korea 
possessed a strong football team and could achieve great things on the world stage (in football as 
well as in other areas). The defeat and reasons for the defeat were isolated into specific maladies – 
in this case, Hiddink’s management policies and his lack of knowledge of Korean players. By 
attacking Hiddink for his supposed failures and depicting him as a villain, the media avoided a 
direct challenge to that underlying discourse of Korean greatness. Later, when the same Korean 
team achieved an unprecedented semi-final finish in the World Cup, Hiddink’s management 
policies were quickly rearticulated as factors which helped Korean players maximise their inherent 
potential. Discourse, therefore, should be considered not a public exertion of coercive force, but a 
fluid and constantly negotiated site of Foucaultian power.  
 
Discourse is, therefore, a performative act; a public, regulated and negotiated act of 
communication which operates on the textual elements described above to produce meaning. 
However, this meaning does not exist in the form of a series of laws or declarations, such as 
‘Americans are xenophobic’ or ‘Africa is primitive’. As the example of Guus Hiddink demonstrates, 
discourse disposes one towards an ideal rather than imposing a definition. Thus, following 
Foucault, power does not explicitly define truth, but rather disciplines and disposes subjects to 
interpret things in particular, regulated ways to produce an effect of ‘truth’.
39
 When the Korean 
media covered the Korea-Italy match in the 2002 World Cup, they were not making explicit 
declarations of Italian perfidy and Korean heroism. Rather, they positioned the audience to 
empathise with the Korean team, producing Korean athletes as committed and hard-working 
underdogs and the coach as canny and intelligent, and the Italians as petty, weak and cowardly 
(when the Koreans could easily have been depicted as violent and unscrupulous, and the Italians 
technically gifted victims of that physicality). This consistent performance of discourse trained the 
Korean audiences to appreciate hard Korean tackles as heroic acts of valour and regard Italian 
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ones as dangerous assaults, ultimately vilifying the entire Italian nation, if only for a time.
40
 
Furthermore, this Korean heroism was recognised not only in its own right, but also in contrast to 
the antithetical villainy of the Italian players: thus emerged a composite and relational 
understanding of nationality that was defined by both what they were and what they were not.
41
 
In such ways, the media texts disposed the audience to derive particular meanings and 
interpretations from their viewing experience, through a discourse that was consistently oriented 
towards a nationalistic ideal. 
 
In summary, two key points can be made about discourse. Firstly, it is a performative act that 
produces meaning from textual elements. Secondly, it employs regulated and structured 
frameworks of interpretation to do so, thus producing an ‘architecture’ of meaning, a system of 
ways of thinking about the text. It is this systemic, structural organisation of meaning that is the 
system of signs. 
 
 
System of Signs 
 
A system of signs can be considered an organised collection of frameworks of interpretation 
defined, articulated, employed and affirmed through discourse; it encompasses systems of 
categorisation, normativity and valuation. While the system has no consolidated form, its 
operation can be verified through moments in which its relations of power are enacted – in this 
case, the discourse of media texts.  
 
The system of signs is an architecture rather than merely a collection, series or landscape. The 
structural arrangement of signs and their relationships are just as important as the signs 
themselves in determining meaning and how one derives meaning. Thus, this architecture has a 
taxonomic function: it discursively categorises things, charts them against ideal norms and delimits 
abnormality, and assigns matrices of value to their positions within the taxonomy (in relation to 
other things and the normative trajectory). The primary modes of structural organisation in the 
system of signs are categories, norms and value systems – the three frameworks of interpretation 
by which we understand things as signs.  
 
Categories organise ideas, objects, people and emotions into particular types, which govern how 
one interprets and reacts to them. An individual that plays football professionally, for instance, is 
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discursively located within the category of athlete, which establishes a Butlerian ‘passionate 
attachment’ of that player to the ‘sporting ethos’.
42
 One is then compelled to interpret that 
individual (now made intelligible as a subject) in relation to previously understood ideals of 
sportsmanship, a certain type of bodily aesthetic and the like, while alternative readings of that 
individual are foreclosed. Nationality, indeed, is used as a category in and of itself. It is a pervasive 
taxonomy that can demarcate a vast number of objects, from individual human characteristics 
such as laziness or honesty to colours, sounds and musical styles. By way of historical and 
anecdotal examples, such qualities can be attached to a national category, and qualities within the 
same national category can then be associated in the symbolic order, forming composite 
impressions of that nationality. This composite nature of nationality makes it a powerful and 
influential category that is able to draw upon a huge range of narratives and signs. As a recent 
example, the Romanian government found out how enduring and powerful these categories can 
be in 2009, when its attempts to redefine the country as a vibrant and colourful tourist destination 
met with embarrassing failure.
43
 A composite impression of Romania as primitive, mystical, dark 
and foreboding had emerged around the legend of Count Dracula over several decades; far from 
dispelling or subverting it, the government’s advertising campaigns simply could not compete with 
it as an enduring, collective imaginary. 
 
Norms and normativity refer to the ways in which discursive enactment of power establishes an 
ideal norm, and then positions all other things within that category in relation to that norm, 
mapping out a graduated field of the normal and abnormal.
44
 Normativity operates in two levels 
with regards to nationality. There is first a normative trajectory that defines the ‘normal’ of that 
nationality – the theoretical spectre of the ideal Korean – and gradations of normality and 
abnormality in relation to it.
45
 At a more basic level, there is then a normative expectation of one’s 
relationship to one’s nationality, which includes the vernacular idea of patriotism. In such a system, 
the aberrations to the norm are also mapped in a way that allows for their existence and, by way 
of negative example, affirms the normal. The Korean that is not ‘Korean’ becomes an example of 
the importance of being a ‘proper’ Korean, and a foreigner that loves Korea or exhibits ‘Korean’ 
values is appropriated as an affirmation of Korean nationality. In such ways, contradictions or 
violations of normative Korean-ness are isolated and positioned in such a way that they enforce 
the validity of what they oppose or contradict.
46
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Systems of value enable and compel comparative judgments of quality, validity and social capital. 
Pierre Bourdieu asserts that all linguistic communication occurs within a market of such value, an 
economic exchange predicated on relationships of symbolic power.
47
 That is to say, discursive 
performances are the mechanisms for the attribution or accreditation of value for all parties 
involved – the performer, the addressed, and the discourse itself. When a mayor gives a speech to 
the citizen body, his or her social standing and the legitimacy of the employed discourse is at 
stake
48
: he or she would be aiming to establish an authoritative position through the appropriate 
discourse of government and civic patronage, enabling him or her to declare ‘truths’ on relevant 
matters of policy.
49
 The systems of categorisation and normativity are intimately connected to this 
process, and provide the standards and expectations by which both the mayor as performer and 
the accompanying utterances as discourse can be evaluated and given value. In the case of 
nationality, the normative trajectory of Korean-ness would be employed for the attribution of 
various values, such as social capital, individual preference, moral right, quality and excellence, 
depending on the context. Finally, “any discourse or practice implies conventional types of 
discourse or practice”
50
: while each discursive performance is judged against an existing matrix of 
value, it also works to re-negotiate and re-affirm the said frameworks.  
 
As a whole, these systems contribute to ideas and ideology that are normative, taxonomic and 
finally subjectivating, in the sense that they cultivate subjects who are founded on these ideas and 
will willingly employ and advocate them.
51
 Within this model, subjectivity can be understood as 
the conditions of social existence – a process by which individuals recognise and internalise 
generalised regimes of truth and knowledge, a ‘grid of intelligibility’ mapped out through the 
discursive enactment of Foucauldian power.
52
 Nationality as a system of signs is a mechanism of 
subjection because it is that taxonomic architecture which imbricates in individuals a naturalised 
understanding of not only what nationality is, but what its social significance is. In this sense, the 
system of signs serves as a reference point and source of identities (of people as well as of nations 
and other impersonal objects). Here, identity is understood as the material product of subjection 
that is an ensemble of performances disposed towards an ideal. An identity consists of habitus, 
markers of identification and social status that is performative and internalised,
53
 manifest in the 
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action, speech and thought of the subject.
54
 Thus, the discursive performance of nationalistic 
identities contributes to reifying and producing the system of signs.  
 
The system of signs, and nationality as a system of signs, is very much a mechanical apparatus. It 
originates from and operates through neither the manipulations of a singular and centralised will, 
or from ‘natural’ and inherent qualities of social life, but through public discourses that produce 
categories, norms and values by which thought is governed. Therefore, understanding nationality 
as a system of signs means recognising that it is not primarily a sacred force or an innate 
demographic quality. This allows us to consider nationality not by beginning from the idea of a 
‘pure’ nationality, and then examining the ways in which it is distorted or misrepresented, but 
accepting that it has always been ‘artificial’, and then critiquing the reality of that artificial 
nationality. The things about nationality that seem the most important and central – national 
identity, pride, patriotism, visual symbols – in fact form only the surface manifestations of this 
deeper mechanism. 
 
The productive process in question, then, is as follows. ‘Text’ is the material site of production, 
which contains textual elements (object, structure, narrative, context) that are the material 
components for meaning-making; ‘discourse’ is a performative process that reifies, produces and 
also contests that meaning. Finally, the ‘system of signs’ is the structured, regulated end result of 
that process, composed of frameworks of interpretation that guide subjects’ understanding of the 
text. Together, these concepts describe a process whereby symbolic meaning is produced as a set 
of structured, regulated ways of thinking, and an enactment of Foucauldian power – implicit, 
subjectivating, normalising, and disciplinary. 
 
 
Spectacle 
 
The model of the system of signs recognises that nationality is a constructed system of thought, 
and that discourse is a key technique in its production. However, it does not explain what kinds of 
nationality are produced through media texts, or their characteristics and styles. I suggest that the 
media industry operates primarily around the logic of the spectacle, and that this logic is 
irrevocably intertwined with the production of nationality. 
 
Spectacle is characterised by its commodity logic and its normative, subjectivising function, 
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derived from Guy Debord’s notion of a pervasive, commoditising and normalising ‘society of the 
spectacle’. Debord’s focus on the political dimension of the spectacle and his polemical debates on 
totalitarianism, however, are less relevant for this study; instead, the spectacle is here conceived 
as an indulgent phantasmagoria. It is a tantalising, theatrical performance of media images that 
dispose the audience to desire it in both consumptive and subjective modes, demanding more of 
the spectacular image and willingly becoming subjects of the spectacular logic.
55
  
 
Spectacle, in the Debordian sense, is predicated on the notion of ‘integration’, or total 
appropriation. According to Debord, this totality of the spectacle means that the spectacular way 
of presenting reality, performing identity and standard of exchange value has replaced any 
preceding ‘Real’, forming an entire social logic that is able to operate autonomously.
56
 Thus “all 
that was once directly lived has become mere representation”
57
. Such a totality is compatible with 
Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum, in that one’s perception of the world comes entirely from 
a collection of images produced by the logic of the commodity.
58
 Together, it can be argued that 
the imaginary spectacle replaces the Real completely, and its images mediate all social 
relationships.
59
 Consequently, the consumption of symbolic goods has become the only way to 
understand social reality; it sets the ‘domains of conceivability’.
60
  
 
This is the totality of the commodity, or the total domination of exchange value. Debord wrote 
that the logic of the commodity has now pervaded the entirety of lived experience.
61
 In other 
words, every person, object and situation potentially can be judged by his or her potential 
exchange value on the market.
62
 Together with the idea of integration, this means that various 
fields that were previously held as sacred from the market have now been appropriated by the 
spectacle. This includes art, national heritage (and indeed, nationality itself), journalism and news, 
the family (private familial events and processes) and more. But this appropriation is rarely so 
complete as to eliminate that sense of sanctity and the ideology that was held sacred; in fact, the 
spectacle prefers to maintain the illusion that these fields are still sacred, in order to leverage that 
sanctity for additional value. For media texts that make spectacles of national events, nationality 
remains a sacred ideology: it is discursively produced as a power that brings people together and 
gives a sense of belonging, sacred in theory and spectacular in practice. In fact, such an ideology 
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operates as a Lacanian ‘universal Lie’
63
, a disavowed belief that says, ‘we all know this is a 
spectacle for consumption and profit, and that it does not operate fully in terms of this 
nationalistic ideal, but we will act and speak as if it does anyway.’ 
64
 It is a simulacrum that is 
coterminous with the field itself, real in function if not in definition. 
 
A number of qualities are generally valued throughout sites of spectacular production, and many 
of them can be found in the Korean media coverage of the 2002 World Cup. Of these, perhaps the 
most relevant for the idea of nationality is that of authenticity. Despite, or perhaps because of, the 
contrived nature of a spectacle, one of its greatest selling points is the idea that the meaning and 
experience derived from the spectacle are experienced as real, and not simply manufactured for 
the consumer’s indulgence. The spectacle also promises strange, new and exciting authenticities. 
The spectacle’s logic of the commodity constructs exotic, yet consumable difference –
decontextualised sets of aesthetic tropes calculated to entice the viewers.
65
 It is a fetish of the 
exotic and, more generally, of novelty; a discursive stratagem for the cultivation of audiences who 
are led to desire the newest (and, by implication, the best) product on the market.
66
   
 
Another characteristic of the spectacle is the transformation of expertise. Institutionally qualified 
experts become the sole source of authority and opinion, and the invocation of this institutional 
authority endows discourse with legitimacy. Football coverage is now run through pundits that 
explain and judge players and events before, during and after matches. Scientists, whose white 
lab-coats function as almost ceremonial signifiers of knowledge and power, are utilised in every 
kind of story to provide institutionally approved statistics and explanations to ‘how things really 
work’, and the truth of what we are seeing. During the 2002 World Cup, academics were in high 
demand by current affairs, lifestyle and documentary programs, which would ask psychology 
professors about the street supporters’ motivations, or management professors about Hiddink’s 
coaching techniques. Opinions of an individual supporter, in comparison, were treated with less 
respect, considered in terms of the expert’s arguments, or simply isolated as anecdotal evidence 
and dismissed. This meant that, ironically, the discourse of a new and individualistic Korea was 
produced through the authority of government institutions and reputable universities. Debord 
claimed that in all kinds of stories, statistics and explanations, the spectacle claims the sole right to 
expertise and to the regime of truth.
67
 The respectful use of institutional expertise was one of the 
key ways in which media discourse acquired legitimacy and authority. 
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The spectacle is also, necessarily, a drama. While not explicitly identified by Debord, his 
discussions make clear that there is a dramatic quality to spectacular commodities and a fetishistic 
demand for it, which is of particular relevance to a study of media sport. This is not unique to the 
contemporary spectacle: Baudrillard, for instance, mentions the key role dramatised, public 
spectacles at the church and court played in the demonstration of imperial power in medieval 
Europe.
68
 What is new is the unprecedented level of control the mass media now exerts over the 
representation of reality. In other words, so much of a ‘real event’ is now subject to technical 
manipulation, and so strong is the desire for consumable drama, that the result is reality 
reappropriated and manufactured to the service of dramatised spectacle.
69
 This has strong 
relevance for the systems of categorisation that we derive from the media, as they will often tend 
towards familiar relationships and conflicts to produce drama in every situation.
70
 
 
All these systems of spectacular society maintain their dominance through the voluntary co-
optation of its subjects. Following the logic of the integrated spectacle, the internalisation and 
reproduction of spectacular images has become the only way to produce socially acceptable 
identities.
71
 The spectacle subjectivates individuals in a voluntary manner; “the spectators want to 
be just as illogical as the spectacle”.
72
 Even resistant and alternative world views or identities must 
obey the logic of the spectacle, since the media has become the only way to be recognised, and 
avoid ‘social death’.
73
 This is in fact compatible with Foucault’s model of power and subjectivity. As 
Crary has shown, the Foucauldian surveillance that encourages prisoners to voluntarily adopt the 
identity of the prisoner is akin to the spectacle that cultivates consumers to voluntarily reproduce 
the spectacle they see and consume; the spectacle is now the site of that grid of intelligibility 
through which subjects locate their social significance.
74
 
 
In short, the spectacle is a general logic that pervades society, and the system of nationality is a 
specific network of signs that has been produced through texts. The spectacle is a logic that deals 
with interest and process – an interest in commodification and all its related functions, such as 
profitability, audience capture, branding, and the process of commoditising, including the 
tendency towards the visual, the immediate, the dramatic, the novel and exotic. It is a general 
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logic that has to do with what we consider to be viable and advantageous, and how to produce 
those qualities in a consumable form. It is a shell or template for spectacular production that 
obeys the logic of the commodity. On the other hand, the system of signs is concerned with 
meaning and identity – affixing meaning to things and identifying norms and value. It is a general 
logic that considers what the world is, which fits in that spectacular template and is produced in a 
spectacular manner. Thus there is a hierarchical relationship between spectacle and nationality: 
nationality is one of the specific, material forms that the general logic of the spectacle affects, one 
example of a realm of thought, behaviour, speech and signification that has been reappropriated 
by the logic of the spectacle. In short, nationality as a system of signs is now a spectacular 
nationality.  
 
The spectacle, then, is a template for the production of meaning in a way that especially privileges 
commercial viability, dramatic entertainment and visual attraction. It has, in contemporary society, 
reached such a level of pervasive normality that it can be considered a general and dominant logic, 
especially for the production of media texts. This spectacular nature of media sport plays an 
important part in determining how nationality is produced through that media.    
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Operating from the position that nationality is a system of signs, and that the conditions of its 
production are governed by the logic of the spectacle, the Korean media coverage of the 2002 
World Cup was qualitatively analysed to provide a case study of spectacular nationality at work. A 
significant sample of press and broadcast media from the period before, during and after the 2002 
World Cup was complemented by academic and popular literature from both Korean and Western 
sources. The wide and varied range of the sampled data allowed for the preservation of the 
contexts in which the discourses of nationality were produced, adequately reflecting the flood of 
media coverage that engulfed Korea at the time. This media-centric sample also focuses on the 
types of discourses that are employed by the media individually and as a whole over time, 
allowing a comprehensive examination of the techniques of nationality production. 
 
Print media constituted a significant portion of the media sample. Despite the global panic over 
the ‘end times’ of newspapers in 2008-9, symbolised by the financial troubles of the New York 
Times, print media remains a cornerstone of mass media and the news in Korea and worldwide. 
Although Korea in 2002 was already boasting unusually high levels of internet penetration and 
usage, internet ‘news portals’ such as Naver and Daum, who now dominate the news industry, 
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were still in their infancy. In practical terms, the absence of reliable archives has prevented the 
gathering of a comprehensive sample from internet media. As such, this case study primarily 
examines articles from the two most prominent newspapers in Korea at the time – Chosun Ilbo 
and Donga Ilbo. 
 
Largely due to the influence of the military dictatorships until the 1980’s, most major Korean 
newspapers range from mildly to extremely conservative, and are openly recognised as such. 
Chosun Ilbo, the most widely read newspaper in the country, is seen as moderately conservative
75
, 
while Donga Ilbo, another prominent newspaper, is considered strongly conservative. While the 
Han’gyŏrae represents a more liberal viewpoint, its archives were not available for research. Every 
article published by the two newspapers from 9 May 2002 to 15 July 2002, including the 
tournament schedule of 1 June to 1 July, was examined for discussions on the World Cup or 
related phenomena. Of these, a total of 931 articles discussed ideas relevant to spectacular 
nationality. They were coded into a quantitative tagged index (Table A), and individually analysed 
for textual elements and their use of discourses on nationality.  
 
Table A: Media Data Tags (Inclusive) 
General General All miscellaneous articles 
Branding Civic Training Improving manners and public order in the Korean citizen 
body 
Economy Korea’s brand image and economic consequences 
Hospitality Providing hospitality for foreign guests 
‘Celebrity Athletes’ Ahn Jung-Hwan Depiction of Ahn, one of the players in the Korean team  
Lee Chun-Soo Depiction of Lee, one of the players in the Korean team 
Park Ji-Sung Depiction of Park, one of the players in the Korean team 
Veteran Players Depiction of Hong Myung-Bo and/or Hwang Sun-Hong, 
two of the players in the Korean team 
Other Depiction of other players in the Korean team 
‘Foreigners’ Guus Hiddink Cult Depiction of Guus Hiddink and the cult of adoration 
around him 
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Other Other articles in the category 
Nationality Foreign Judgment Use of foreign sources or invoking foreigners to evaluate 
Korea 
Other Cultures Depiction of other cultures as exotic or superior/inferior 
Pride, Identity Discussions of national pride, patriotism and identity 
Other Other articles in the category 
‘Red Devils’ Citizen Supporters Discussion of ordinary Koreans supporting in the streets 
Commodification Discussion of merchandise and other commodities 
Red Devils Discussion of actual Red Devils members and/or 
organisation 
Other Other articles in the category 
 
By encompassing the entirety of the published material from the two newspapers in the selected 
period, the print media data was able to track both day-to-day changes and longer term trends in 
the publications. In broad terms, both newspapers showed an overriding interest in promoting the 
World Cup in three ways: as a ‘global festival’ of cultures and peoples that are brought together in 
a utopian vision of globalisation; as a test of Korea’s hospitality and civic order for the world to 
judge; and as an adventure of the Korean national football team as underdogs. All three of these 
grand narratives both enforced and accepted an implicit understanding of the World Cup as a 
desirable occurrence and opportunity. These optimistic depictions were deployed in a surprisingly 
consistent and uniform manner across newspapers, time periods and genres. Explicit discussions 
of Korean nationality were commonplace in every issue, often instructing or exhorting the readers 
to take part in and accelerate the economic, mental and societal evolution of Korea through the 
World Cup. Historical, anecdotal, statistical and philosophical evidence was frequently used in 
every kind of article to support this argument. On the other hand, issues in the field of 
‘entertainment’, such as merchandise and celebrity involvement, were significantly less prominent, 
not fitting easily into existing expectations of conservative newspapers and their content structure. 
The only exception was ‘pure’ sports coverage, where discussions were firmly grounded in the 
field of sport and its familiar topics and languages. While media sport is not separate from 
discourses of nationality, they retained a degree of autonomy as discourses of sport. 
 
Broadcast media involved a more selective sample: I have made use of the most prominent and 
visible media texts in Korean television during the same period. In this period, Korean television 
was dominated by three media broadcasters – the government-owned but independently run KBS, 
and privately owned MBC and the relatively young SBS. SBS, being smaller and with less of a focus 
on sports content, was unable to compete with the other two, however, and chose not to pursue 
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World Cup related coverage as aggressively.
76
 On the other hand, KBS and MBC were extremely 
active in maximising the quantity and variety of World Cup related programs, which were so highly 
prioritised as to push news programs and high-rating dramas out of their time slots. The Korean 
matches were shown live, as well as in several full replays, while important moments were played 
in dozens of other programs to achieve what must have been an almost total level of exposure.
77
 
Television played an extremely prominent role as gatekeeper and narrator during this period: the 
most popular World Cup-related programs achieved audience ratings of 20 to 30 per cent, while 
MBC’s prime time news program achieved a 30 per cent spike in audience ratings by packing its 
schedule of some seventy World Cup related bulletins.
78
  
 
For research purposes, 29 programs from KBS and MBC were selected based on their audience 
ratings. When these were not available, the prominence of the program (deducible by elements 
such as time slots, promotional blurbs and choice of hosts) was used. The programs included 
prime time news, special features made to celebrate and review the World Cup and normal 
programs which had adopted World Cup as a visual and topical theme, such as breakfast programs 
and current affairs debates. The coverage of Korea’s seven World Cup matches from the two 
broadcasters was also analysed. These broadcast items were indexed according to the same tags 
as print media (Table A), and independently and comparatively examined for the discursive 
production of Korean nationality.  
 
The data from the broadcast media provided further evidence as to the remarkable symmetry 
across mediums, genres and publications in the way the World Cup was reported in Korea. The 
same limited types of stories, framing and narratives were exhaustively and repeatedly produced 
across the analysed programs, to the point that the footage, and the way in which they were used, 
were interchangeable. Endless shots of nameless supporters coalesced together to form an 
imagined totality of celebration, while the same highlight reel of Korean goals in the tournament 
was played in almost every program (and often multiple times in each program), becoming 
established as the pre-eminent, iconic image of Korean success. This uniformity persisted in the 
symbolic order. A small number of immediately recognisable and familiar conventions in television 
texts were employed at every opportunity to produce the same kind of emotional responses. 
Sounds of the ‘tae-han-min-guk’ chants and the ‘o- p’ilsŭng K’oria’ song
79
 were combined with 
quick montages of supporters to convey the aforementioned idea of a totality of Korean 
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celebration, while epic orchestral music and slow-motion shots amplified the sense of triumph in 
moments of success. Conventions from Korean soap dramas were often borrowed for profiles of 
individual athletes and coach Guus Hiddink, such as familiar narrative themes of family and 
hardship set against reflective, piano-based instrumental music, to produce the football stars in 
terms of immediately identifiable signifiers. During the 2002 World Cup, Korean television played 
an important role in not only determining the key stories of the day and the terms in which they 
would be understood, but also in providing these stories, figures and events with ‘personalities’, 
encouraging emotional and personal connections with them.  
 
In the following chapters, the findings from this research of academic texts, print media and 
broadcast media will be examined in order to analyse and consider what kind of Korean nationality 
was being produced by the media coverage, and how this was carried out. I suggest that a 
spectacular Korean nationality was being produced in this period both internally, through positive 
affirmations of the validity and viability of the Self, and externally, through the construction of a 
foreign gaze that would be used to define and affirm Korean nationality. 
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3. Red Devils: Affirming Nationality 
 
“Cries of joy. A united voice and red passion. Streets filled with happy faces that had 
not been there before. In June 2002, twenty-two million people took to the streets in 
Korea. We discovered a new ‘us’, and the world paid tribute to our passion.” 
80
 
 
“Men and women, young and old all shout with one voice: tae-han-min-guk. The cries 
of the supporters are still ringing in my ears. From the passionate cheering worthy of a 
football sŏnjin’guk to the voluntary cleaning up afterwards, right now the entire world 
is taking note of our advanced supporting culture.” 
81
  
  
The 2002 World Cup was a remarkable event for the South Korean nation not only in terms of its 
success on the football pitch, but also because the surreal phenomenon of ‘street supporters’ - 
millions of Koreans who took to the streets to support their team and celebrate that success. What 
made this even more remarkable was the apparent lack of any centralised agency organising or 
regulating these street supporters. The Korean media, government and academia hurried to 
proclaim this phenomenon as both evidence of and catalyst for an evolution and revitalisation of 
Korean society and mentality, an interpretation that was presented with almost no dissent or 
counter-argument in the public sphere. 
 
In this section, the phenomenon of the street supporters is examined from its origins in a small 
group of football fans, the Red Devils, to its eventual life as a collective imaginary in the mass 
media, composed of general, abstracted national narratives on one hand and readily consumable 
spectacles of fashion and performative identities on the other. I suggest that the largely 
spontaneous phenomenon of the street supporters was quickly identified and appropriated by the 
mass media in order to create easily understood, memorable and consumable signs of Korean 
nationality. In doing so, the media enacted a transformation of a lived experience of spontaneous 
supporting activity into a mediated and collective imaginary of Korean-ness, drawing back on and 
extending existing narratives and discourses of Korean nationality. Not only did the media produce 
a particular interpretation of the phenomenon and a particular understanding of Korean 
                                           
80
 MBC sŭpeshŏl – pulgŭnangma, hanbandorŭl ch’ukcheŭi jangŭro (MBC special – The Red Devils, and Korea 
a land of festival). Seoul: MBC, July 2002. 
81
 welkŏm 2002 wŏldŭkŏp – sinhwachangjo taehanmin’guk – ŭngwon wŏldŭkŏp (Welcome 2002 World Cup 
– taehanmin’guk, A New Legend – A Supporters’ World Cup). Seoul: KBS, June 2002. 
R e d  D e v i l s :  A f f i r m a t i o n s  o f  N a t i o n a l i t y  | 33 
 
nationality; it also produced a type of nationality that is performed in spectacular ways and 
through the consumption of spectacular entertainment. 
 
 
The Red Devils 
 
The term ‘Red Devils’ originally referred to a supporters’ group for the Korean national football 
team, a grassroots movement founded in 1997. In previous years, Korea’s appearances in the 
World Cup finals had helped build enthusiasm for football, as had the upgrading of the domestic 
league into a fully professional outfit. The founding members of the Red Devils came from a 
background of dedicated football fandom, and were primarily inspired by the highly developed, 
well-organised and popular supporter culture in European nations such as England and Italy.
82
 At 
the core, the Red Devils were therefore concerned with development and progress in the field of 
football as a sport. Their primary objective was to help build in Korea the kind of ‘advanced’ 
supporter culture that they had witnessed in Europe. The original members of the Red Devils also 
tended to be strongly patriotic: ideas of promoting Korean nationality and developing uniquely 
‘Korean’ forms of support factored prominently in their early discussions.
83
 Elements of traditional 
Korean culture, such as samullori, a traditional percussion and dance arrangement, were adopted 
into chants, insignia and movements in a bid to create a Korean supporter culture, though this was 
modelled after European precedents. The Red Devils hoped to create an immediately identifiable 
and memorable visual performance of Korean nationality, and thus promote football to Koreans 
and Korea to the world. Finally, the Red Devils placed a strong emphasis on staying true to their 
roots. The group pursued this principle almost obsessively, depriving any single member or 
committee of complete control, refusing almost every form of corporate sponsorship and refusing 
to leverage their later popularity for political purposes.
84
  
 
The Red Devils, in their original form, thus consisted of a complex web of motivations and values. 
While their stated objectives are as much about national pride as their love of football, the Red 
Devils were first and foremost a football-oriented group, and firmly located in the field of sport. 
Despite efforts to create ‘Korean’ forms of support, European supporter culture was firmly held as 
the ideal model to aspire to, and the group wasted no effort in instructing both members and non-
members in ‘correct’ forms of support. For the Red Devils up to 2002, the act of supporting was 
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not centred on the festive atmosphere and enjoyment, but intimately connected with knowledge 
of football and a series of dynamic reactions to events in the match with a view to influencing its 
progress. The following record of a Red Devils executive meeting illustrates this perspective: 
 
“The Red Devils executives identified a number of problems with the growing Red 
Devils [in early 2000’s]. One issue was that of supporters who were so focused on 
cheering they were apathetic about the rest of the match. The argument was that 
supporters who were obsessed with cheering and making waves even when the team 
was losing were counterproductive to the original purpose of live spectatorship. 
Because the outward elements developed before the purposes of spectator culture 
were not adequately communicated, the role of a proper supporter’s group could not 
be fulfilled…”
85
 
 
Throughout the 1998 World Cup and other appearances by the Korean national football team, the 
Red Devils continued to develop as a supporters’ club, well known to fans of football but virtually 
unknown to the population at large. 
 
All this changed with the 2002 World Cup. The explosion of the ‘street supporters’ phenomenon 
during the tournament effected an almost complete transformation of the ways in which Koreans 
watched football, and the role the Red Devils as a group played. For the first time, the World Cup 
was not thousands of miles away for Koreans, but highly accessible; and for the first time, the 
Korean team was winning matches. The Red Devils, who had become used to a membership base 
of a few thousand, and perhaps a peak of a hundred thousand during major tournaments, were 
bombarded with up to 7 million registrations.
86
 While football fans had always cheered and 
watched the game from outside the stadium, or in public places when they could not acquire 
tickets, the sheer scale of these ‘street supporters’ gave a new complexion to the phenomenon. 
The mass media had considered the Red Devils a minority fan group, and had paid them little 
attention; but eventually they adopted the group’s aural and visual elements as the centrepiece of 
World Cup coverage. Indeed, by the end of the tournament, the term ‘Red Devils’ had come to 
refer to the millions of street supporters, or even the Korean nation as a whole. In this thesis, the 
‘Red Devils’ will refer to this official organisation of supporters, and the term ‘street supporters’ 
the millions of casual supporters, unless otherwise specified.  
 
The phenomenon of street supporters was composed of several key characteristics. Above all, its 
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defining quality was the aforementioned inclusiveness: it seemed as if literally everybody in Korea 
was participating. The natural difficulty in gathering accurate numbers on such an ‘unorganised’ 
and fluid gathering was seemingly forgotten, with the media reporting figures in the millions. Later, 
the Seoul Metropolitan Council reported that 53.1% of those surveyed had participated in street 
support.
87
 The Korean media frequently reported on the sheer demographic variety of participants, 
suggesting that every social category was participating in the celebrations with equal enthusiasm 
and in the same way. The most exotic examples, from monks to cruise ship passengers to the 
disabled, were mobilised to show how even the fringes of Korean society were participating in the 
festival. 
 
“The long-awaited knockout stages. The cries of joy are shaking the walls of Chogye 
temple. As the final whistle sounds, both the monks and the faithful rise as one to 
celebrate. The match is over, but emotions are slow to fade. The monks, too, have laid 
aside their normally solemn demeanour. 
  
The monks, who had prayed and prayed for Buddha to lend his power to our World 
Cup bid. Shouting and cheering all throughout the match, truly, they too were ‘Red 
Devils’.”
88
  
 
This juxtaposition of the grey-robed monks and the ‘regular’ supporters in red (Photo A)
89
 was 
symptomatic of the way in which media coverage highlighted difference in order to establish 
uniformity. The coverage demarcated the monks from normal Koreans, and then reported on their 
participation in street support, suggesting that Koreans had united through this phenomenon. The 
street support phenomenon was clearly very 
widespread and visible, and had become far 
more attractive to the media than the 
dedicated efforts of the Red Devils in years 
past.  
 
The expansion of the target audience also 
meant a diluting of sporting discourses and the 
language of sport. In the media’s attempt to 
cater to viewers who are not regular 
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consumers of media sport, extraneous types of narratives and framing, such as human interest 
stories, celebrity stories and features on exotic cultures and historical details, expanded to produce 
a more varied media landscape.
90
 This contributed to the eventual production of a mediated 
interpretation of the World Cup that would reach far beyond the confines of sporting discourse. 
 
Street support grew into an enormous phenomenon with the help of government, corporate and 
media institutions. They had provided infrastructure and organised promotions in anticipation of 
the World Cup, and once the scale of street support began to overtake their wildest predictions, 
hastily responded in whatever way they could. Companies sponsored large-scale screens or 
information stations in public venues, anticipating return of investment in the form of brand 
exposure.
91
 The media took on an even more active role, producing explicit instructive articles and 
programs which guided the audience on the ‘right’ way to spectate and support.  
 
“Ten rules to keep in mind when watching the World Cup: 
1.Let’s do light stretches before and after a match to release tension 
2.Let’s drink water frequently to wet the vocal cords 
... 
6.Let’s take care of the children – they may exhibit signs of anxiety after a match  
7.Let’s not become too obsessed with the match, but enjoy it”
92
 
 
This typical health advisory in the daily newspaper was in fact an amalgam of advice and 
instruction in the fields of medicine, family and even individual psychology, in an effort to reassert 
regulations and rules with regard to a new and unpredictable activity. The repeated use of ‘Let’s’ 
was part of a general and common use of the pronoun ‘we’, through which a specific and inclusive 
form of exhortation was achieved. These paternalistic guidelines were accompanied by media 
coverage of scenes of support around the country. These would, by way of example, establish what 
methods of support were acceptable, fashionable and preferable. In one such program, the hosts 
reviewed coverage of supporters in various locations from a previous Korean match, and then 
mapped out the ‘right’ place of support for each demographic. 
 
“There is the mecca of support, the city hall, and also the Han river park, but also, the 
younger supporters mostly congregate around Taehangno (‘University Road’) – and 
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there are rumours that you can also fix up some on-the-spot blind dates! Working 
adults gather at Samsung Station, and there is the Seoul Equestrian Park and Chamshil 
baseball stadium for those who might need a sit-down to last the match.”
93
 
 
Finally, as corporate and media attention grew, the street support phenomenon quickly evolved 
beyond the ‘core’ activity of spectatorship and cheering. The millions of supporter-spectators 
formed a new and attractive market of a highly concentrated audience disposed to spend. Street 
vendors, shops, mass media, celebrities, and large corporations all gravitated to this market. While 
the media coverage focused on and iconised the visual image of the supporters, all around them 
an active market of fashion, music, entertainment and small goods had emerged. By far the most 
popular item was the ‘Be the Reds’ shirt, originally designed and distributed by the Red Devils free 
of charge.
94
 However, demand quickly surpassed their production and distribution capacity, and 
soon ‘Be the Reds’ shirts were on sale everywhere: street vendors sported the shirts on their picnic 
mats, while many clothing stores suspended their regular catalogue to make the most of the World 
Cup fever.
95
 Larger corporations such as Samsung also distributed shirts for promotional purposes, 
even delivering ‘Be the Reds’ shirts to other countries such as the Netherlands – emblazoned with 
the Samsung logo.
96
 The vast majority of these shirts were produced and sold without the 
permission of the copyright holder, the Red Devils, but such concerns were submerged under an 
atmosphere of national celebration that supported this environment of consumption. The shirts 
were complemented by scarves, flags, cushions, and even on-the-spot face-painting services,
97
 all 
of which helped create a regime of practice – the achievement and performance of nationality 
through consumption of small goods. 
 
Such a market was closely intertwined with the emergence of what the Korean media called the 
‘t’aegŭkki fashion’. While the Red Devils had long made use of the t’aegŭkki, the Korean flag, and 
other visual signifiers of the Korean nation, they were primarily a way of identifying themselves as 
Korean supporters in the stadium. The street supporters now exceeded the original signification of 
the t’aegŭkki, both as a national flag and as the Red Devils’ visual icon, and manipulated its visual 
elements to create various fashion items, ranging from capes and headwear to accessories. While 
such fashionable and spectacular appropriations of national imagery are commonplace in mega-
events such as the World Cup, the street supporters did so with regard to a signifier whose use had 
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been tightly regulated until the late 1980’s and tied Korean nationality to the sovereignty of the 
state. The t’aegŭkki fashion was also notable in the ways it spilled outside the boundaries of the 
football stadium and the field of football. The following extracts from the Korean media coverage 
show how t’aegŭkki fashion quickly evolved from a simple donning of a red shirt to a 
comprehensive performance through consumption. 
 
“The World Cup begins! Today the party has started. Let’s change to our party clothes. 
The dress code for the party that will last from today to the 30
th
 of June is as follows. 
The World Cup [Korean] national football team uniform, football shoes, thick socks 
that come up to your knees... other than this ‘official’ dress code, tracksuits with strips 
down the sides, shirts with a large number printed on the front or back, trainers and 
wrist-bands are also good choices.”
98
 
 
“The t’aegŭkki is the most popular fashion instrument. Women participate in street 
support wearing skirts, trousers or even belly shirts made out of the t’aegŭkki. Zealous 
men paint their entire upper body in red, and pen the name and number of their 
favourite player on the back.”
99
 
 
“More than once, I have been surprised and awed by the free and imaginative ways in 
which the t’aegŭkki has been used. Capes, bandanas and skirts wrapped around the 
waist are already ‘ordinary’. You’ll need at least tank-tops or miniskirts to get more 
than a quick glance from passers-by.”
100
 
 
In the first extract, published just before the World Cup, the ‘World Cup fashion’ consisted of 
blending everyday clothes with football-related items: by the end of the tournament, t’aegŭkki 
fashion involved a total transformation of the individual’s body with various appropriations of 
national imagery, which would simultaneously locate that individual within the category of Korean 
subjectivity and allow him/her to flaunt the body according to the logic of fashion and sexuality. 
(Photo B)
101
 The government, media and academia joined in the praise and celebration of this 
provocative new fashion, perhaps because they deemed it a surprising and welcome 
demonstration of national pride. This is highly unusual when viewed in the context of Korea's 
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dedication to traditional Confucian values: only a few years prior to the World Cup, the Korean 
media had banned celebrities with dyed hair on television and hotly debated the merits of banning 
belly shirts. Yet the discourse surrounding the t’aegŭkki fashion in 2002 involved a fetishism of 
‘kabyŏum’ (lightness, shallowness); they celebrated the flag’s divestment of its gravitas as a form 
of emancipation and liberation, rather than one of moral decline.
102
 This discourse supported the 
development of the t’aegŭkki fashion into another form of spectacle, involving a performative use 
of the body as a site of commodification. One example of this was Mina. As a supporter during the 
2002 World Cup, she flaunted her revealing and eye-catching t’aegŭkki fashion to attract the 
television cameras, and as a result of this exposure was recruited by a celebrity agency. This was 
repeated with Han Chang-Hŭi after the 2006 World Cup: the two women, and their scores of 
imitators, had identified the t’aegŭkki fashion not simply as a trend, but a market through which 
individual value and fame could be earned. 
 
Those who were already celebrities were also acutely aware of the opportunities street support 
provided. Because of the unprecedented levels of attention the World Cup commanded, and 
because of the extraordinarily positive ways in which support of Korea was regarded, an astute 
celebrity’s public image and popularity could – and did – skyrocket. Celebrities knew that their 
participation, or non-participation, in the festivities would be closely monitored by the media and 
their fans. Many adopted the t’aegŭkki fashion, attended matches, and screamed chants for the 
cameras in an attempt to build empathy and assert their pride in the Korean nation.
103
 Yun Do-
Hyŏn, the leader of a little-known niche rock band (Yun Do-Hyŏn Band), became a household name 
by lending his voice to a single song, ‘o- p’ilsŭng K’oria’, which began as an advertisement theme 
and was quickly adopted by millions of street supporters. Lee Kyŏng-Kyu, arguably the most 
popular comedian in Korean television in the 1990’s, ran a parody commentary program of Korean 
matches throughout the tournament, enjoying excellent audience ratings and bolstering his iconic 
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status. The extensive involvement of celebrities in street support had an important effect on street 
supporters as well, by introducing yet another element into the lived experience of street support. 
Musicians and comedians held or participated in concerts and shows in popular street support 
sites before matches, often with quickly composed World Cup songs based around simple and 
catchy pop tunes. (Photo C)
104
 Watching a football match became just one of a variety of 
experiences on offer for the prospective street supporter. Indeed, the festive atmosphere created 
by the people, the media attention, the t’aegŭkki fashion and the celebrity presence was cited as 
the chief reason for attendance above football spectatorship or national pride.
105
  
 
The relationship between the Red Devils as a supporters’ group and the ‘Red Devils’ street 
supporters was complex. It is undeniable that the 2002 World Cup represented an explosion of 
popularity for the Red Devils: they received a substantial amount of media exposure, operational 
funds in the form of member contributions and corporate donations, and millions of new members, 
though most of these predictably faded away after the tournament. The Red Devils, lending their 
experience and know-how played an important part in the emergence of street supporters. It was 
their chants of tae-han-min-guk, their red shirts and scarves and their giant t’aegŭkki flag that 
provided the basis and precedent for street supporters and their t’aegŭkki fashion. However, this 
relationship quickly spiraled out of the Red Devils’ control. The group’s carefully designed visual 
signifiers and performances were adopted by the nation, but their founding ideologies and 
principles of promoting football, a football-supporting culture and independence from corporate 
influences were left behind. Even the name ‘Red Devils’ was no longer quite their own: it had 
become “a common noun rather than a proper noun”,
106
 referring to street supporters as a whole 
rather than the group. It was easy for street supporters to register on the Red Devils website, learn 
their chants, copy their shirt design and join them in the ‘supporters’ seats’
107
 - even if they had no 
desire to learn more about the group, or take football and supporting seriously. While the original 
Red Devils were lovers of football first and foremost, many street supporters did not share such a 
passionate attachment to the sport. Rather, they were attracted by both a vague but compelling 
sense of national pride and the prospect of an entertaining and captivating spectacle. 
 
Ultimately, the street support phenomenon was not centered on football or patriotism per se. The 
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act of watching football and the sense of national pride complemented the core experience of a 
spectacular environment, with its intoxicating rhythms of hyperactivity.
108
 This spectacle was 
grounded in powerful but nonspecific ways in the discourse of Korean nationality, and manifest 
through familiar forms of commodity consumption. Abstract ideas of nationality and the practical 
activity of spectacular consumption were combined in iconic visual signifiers; in the performative 
nature of participation; in the consumption of fashion, music and celebrity culture; and in an 
overwhelming sense of solidarity that reassured the willing and compelled the unwilling.
109
 The 
street support was a spectacle of commodified nationality, whose participants experienced a 
collective fantasy of uncommodified nationality. 
 
 
Making the Spectacle 
 
The emergence of the street supporting phenomenon and its superseding of the original Red 
Devils in the symbolic order had important consequences for the ways in which Korean nationality 
was produced during the 2002 World Cup. At the time, the general consensus, in the media and 
elsewhere, was that the street supporting phenomenon was a spontaneous explosion of national 
pride, a dormant desire that had found an outlet through the mega-event. But this idea of 
‘spontaneity’ was largely applied retrospectively. The surprising and unique nature of that visible 
result then made it a foregone conclusion: the overwhelming level of participation and 
enthusiasm seemed to defy ordinary explanations. Accordingly, contemporary analyses of the 
phenomenon – both media and scholarly - looked to abstract explanations of Korean mentality 
and culture to explain the street supporters. But what was not examined was how they were able 
to take to the streets. The media played a crucial role in this process, contributing to both the 
popularisation of street support and its commodification. It helped ensure, both in the lived 
experience of participants and first-hand observers and in the mediated image, the transformation 
of the Red Devils from a supporter group to a spectacle of street support. That there was a strong 
element of patriotism in most of the street supporters cannot be disputed; but the mechanisms 
that enabled them to express this patriotism were provided by the mass media, which produced a 
system that facilitated a strong affective response through the consumption of an entertainment 
spectacle. 
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The chronology of such a transformation must begin with the Red Devils as a supporters’ group, 
and the type of media coverage and exposure they had been receiving prior to the 2002 World 
Cup. As late as May 2002, the Red Devils were at the fringes of the media landscape of World Cup 
coverage. Furthermore, this coverage confined the Red Devils within a familiar archetype of the 
‘eccentric fan’. In one televised feature on the group
110
, the media focused not on the Red Devils’ 
organisational characteristics or the details of their supporting activities, but on a dedicated family 
of supporters. The program opened with unassuming and domestic shots of apartment blocks, 
happy kids in Red Devils regalia and other familiar and friendly images. The image (Photo D)
111
 of 
the entire family in supporter kits framed their identity as Red Devils, signified through their 
striking attire, in the context of a normal Korean family. This established a semantic 
macrostructure that identified the show as a ‘human interest’ story.
112
 The program went on to 
emphasise personal and affective 
details about the family’s dedication 
to football. The mix of heartwarming 
images of a happy family and their 
eccentric fan support established the 
Red Devils as a strange but loveable 
minority in Korean society. Similarly, 
in May 17 2002, the Chosun Ilbo ran 
a story on the Red Devils under the 
headline “wŏldŭk’ŏp ŭngwone 
‘mich’in’ yŏrhyŏllamnyŏ” (Fanatical 
about cheering for the World Cup), 
featuring anecdotal stories of Red Devils: 
 
“[Jung, a Red Devil] turns up early to his KTF office every day to contact his fellow Red 
Devils and discuss new ideas for supporting. He also attends every World Cup-related 
event without fail. He says that his father, Jung Myung-Hyeon (55, Professor of 
Medicine, Yonsei University) had not approved of his participation in a supporters’ 
group, but is now much more understanding. 
 
[Jung:] ‘My parents were very worried in the beginning. I think once, my mother came 
to me and said, ‘they showed you with your face painted red and screaming on 
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television’ – she was horrified!’”
113
 
 
The fanatical level of devotion demonstrated by Jung may appear strange or laughable, depending 
on the audience. In tandem with the headline, the article implicitly emphasises the abnormality of 
the Red Devils. But this difference from the norm is never produced in such a way as to render the 
Red Devils dangerous or incomprehensible. The level of abnormality remained at an ‘acceptable’ 
level. They were to be consumed as an entertaining and heart-warming interlude in the general 
narrative of the World Cup. Though the press and broadcast media did not hesitate to explicitly 
instruct their audience on matters of public order and hospitality, they made no real effort to 
encourage ordinary Koreans to take up the cause of these football fanatics. As late as the 
international friendly between Korea and England, held a week before the World Cup, the street 
supporting ‘phenomenon’ was non-existent: only a few hundred Red Devils covered themselves in 
red and engaged in organised, practiced chanting.
114
 
 
However, this pattern of coverage quickly changed when journalists began to notice the growing 
numbers of Koreans taking to the streets to watch and support their national team. Seemingly out 
of nowhere, the casual and unfocused gatherings of spectators in the pre-tournament friendlies 
transformed into highly enthusiastic and dedicated gatherings of supporters growing larger and 
more fanatical with every World Cup match. At the beginning, the street support phenomenon was 
to an extent spontaneous, although individual interest in the World Cup and a desire for festivities 
was cultivated by government, media and business-driven campaigns to build awareness and 
enthusiasm. Yet by the time of the third Korean match two weeks into the World Cup, the media 
had fully adopted the role of reporting on street support, interpreting and bestowing upon it a 
greater significance. The semiotic elements of the street supporters were appropriated and 
positioned as the primary signifiers of the 2002 World Cup. Newspaper articles reporting on the 
street supporters became more and more common. In contrast to the model of the eccentric, 
which was used with regard to the Red Devils, the language used for street supporters became 
more inclusive and celebratory, and articles mobilised discourses of national pride and identity to 
interpret the events. The Donga Ilbo published the following in the wake of Korea’s first World Cup 
match against Poland: 
 
“...some thirty thousand citizens had been cheering for the Korean team at the Daegu 
National Debt Repayment Commemoration Park, where giant screens had been 
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installed. When the final whistle blew at ten forty-three in the evening, they all 
shouted ‘tae-han-min-guk’ as one and celebrated [the victory]. The citizens stayed on 
for some thirty minutes after the end of the match, watching key highlights through 
the screens and celebrating the victory with each other.”
115
 
 
“Approximately one hundred thousand people completely filled the roads. The citizens’ 
red shirts recalled a ‘red sea’... when Hwang Sun-Hong with a cool finish scored the 
first goal, shouts shook the sky and the earth, and the citizens went mad with 
excitement. Together with the ‘Red Devils’ supporters, the citizens waved their 
t’aegŭkki, hugged each other and cried ‘tae-han-min-guk’.”
116
 
 
Though the core activity they describe remained similar to the older coverage of the Red Devils, 
the way in which they were presented was very different. Headlines of the above articles featured 
phrases such as “when the nation became one” and “we created a legend”, which immediately 
disposed readers to identify with the street supporters, establishing them as normative Koreans. In 
addition, the street supporters were consistently interpellated as ‘citizens’. While this terminology 
is not as unusual in Korean as it is in a Western context, it brings to the fore the subjectivation of 
street supporters as Koreans. These articles were also replete with the use of poetic and emotional 
language, a very unusual strategy for newspapers of such conservative leanings. Their discursive 
techniques complemented each other to create a series of media texts that positioned the 
audience in an identical space with street supporters, and in doing so, more or less compelled 
participation – as if asking, ‘you are a Korean like us... aren’t you?’. These chronicles of ‘all Koreans 
as street supporters’ were produced in great quantity and with a high level of uniformity from early 
June onwards, as the Korean media began to note and encourage the phenomenon. The two 
extracts above were, in fact, published on the same day, only a few pages apart from each other – 
with additional, similar stories of street supporters squeezed in those few pages. These stories in 
the print media, in general, followed a common pattern involving: 
 
• A headline using inclusive and exhortative language, and discourses of solidarity and 
national pride 
• A lead-in using poetic, grandiose language for emotive effect 
• Anecdotal stories of dedicated street supporters 
• Occasionally, numerical figures and statistics, such as the size of congregations, to 
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highlight the scale of street support 
• Occasionally, mention of foreigners’ amazement and approval 
• Occasionally, reference to displays of public order and civic responsibility 
• A conclusion invoking discourses of solidarity and national pride
117
    
 
This pattern imposed a chronology of its own, whereby the headline and lead-in ‘installed’ a 
taxonomic framework of nationality and patriotism, and then mobilised stories of individual street 
supporters and events to support this interpretation.
118
 Therefore, the structure and discourse of 
these stories presented the street supporters not as extremes but as norms; their behaviour was 
not only to be admired, but to be imitated and internalised. This pattern was also maintained in 
television coverage, although in different forms to fit the medium. The aural and visual elements of 
the street supporters were promoted at every opportunity: show hosts and celebrities donned ‘Be 
the Reds’ shirts and worked the chant ‘tae-han-min-guk’ into their sentences, even as they offered 
token apologies to the audience for their ‘unprofessional’ level of enthusiasm.
119
 The shots of 
street supporters were, after the highlights of the Korean matches themselves, the most frequently 
broadcast image in World Cup coverage, and supporters’ songs were used as background tracks 
even in the news.  
 
Finally, corporate marketing and sponsorship also contributed to the popularisation of the street 
support phenomenon. ‘O-p’ilsŭng K’oria’ was by far the most popular and iconic supporters’ song 
in the 2002 World Cup. Adopted from a local sports club by the Red Devils, it had been in use for 
some time before the tournament: however, it was only when SK Telecom remixed the song, 
enlisted the voice of Yun Do-Hyŏn, and produced it as soundtrack for an advertisement that the 
song became nationally popular.
120
 Advertisements are an important part of the Korean media 
landscape. Factors such as a dominant presence of high profile celebrities, investment leading to 
high production values and a focus on narrative is particularly pronounced in Korea. Consequently, 
they are seen as fully legitimate media texts with a powerful influence on the public image of not 
only the advertisers and their products, but the celebrities and cultural tropes that feature in 
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them.
121
 In this context, the SK Telecom advertisement built enthusiasm about street supporting 
and the World Cup. The company continued to assert this role, with another advert featuring Red 
Devils members teaching the viewers the ‘tae-han-min-guk’ chant.
122
 
 
The combination of media coverage and corporate marketing propelled the street supporting 
phenomenon to extraordinary levels of participation and enthusiasm. They provided the exposure 
and the tools for the phenomenon to flourish. Though the media had not and could not have given 
birth to the phenomenon, it played a key role in popularising it and providing it with an iconic 
status in the public mindset. The Red Devils continued to be important, especially in organising 
support at the ground level. However, as the street support grew larger, media coverage 
determined the terms of its symbolic existence, and framed the ways in which it would be 
interpreted and experienced. The result was an entertainment spectacle that encouraged and even 
compelled Koreans to participate through consumption. 
 
 
A Commodity Spectacle 
 
In the vernacular, this entertainment spectacle was described as ‘World Cup fever’. Media 
enthusiasm may have appeared as ‘spontaneous’ and unguided as the phenomenon of street 
support did, but in fact was organised in a way that maximised potential for commodification. The 
World Cup fever was cultivated to establish consumption of entertainment commodities as a 
central mechanism for the creation and satisfaction of desire. The target audience of this media 
spectacle (and the discourse of World Cup fever) was disposed to find satisfaction and fulfilment 
in consumption – not only the desire for entertainment or drama, but also the articulation of 
national pride. 
 
The street support phenomenon, therefore, can be conceptualised as a ‘commodity situation’, 
where Korean nationality is produced as a spectacular commodity. The idea of the commodity 
situation comes from Arjun Appadurai, who removes the commodity from the narrow definition of 
an exchange of goods for money in capitalist societies, pointing out that even a gift is a social act 
that is a form of exchange involving social capital.
123
 He suggests that “the commodity situation in 
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the social life of any ‘thing’ be defined as the situation in which its exchangeability (past, present 
or future) for some other thing is its socially relevant feature.”
124
 Street support, both as an 
activity undertaken by individuals and observed by others, was appropriated by a number of fields 
to establish such commodity situations. These ranged from on-the-spot sales of various World Cup 
and Korea-related merchandise, which directly linked commodities to the lived experience of 
street support, to the bombardment of news and entertainment media coverage on the street 
supporters, which reorganised the image, discourse and ideology of the phenomenon into a 
consumable media text. In Appadurai’s terms, the ‘commodity candidacy’ of the street support 
phenomenon was maximised in the contexts of entertainment and nationality,
125
 and resulted in 
an organic formulation of a varied, pervasive and captivating spectacle. As the media, large 
corporations and small businesses all worked to activate the commodity potential in the street 
support phenomenon in their own particular ways, the consumer-subject was increasingly 
positioned in the midst of a relentless flow of entertainment programs, news reports, informative 
and instructive communiqués, World Cup merchandise, corporate sponsored events and 
promotions, celebrity concerts and more.  
 
In this respect, it is crucial to understand the ways in which the media coverage colonised the 
social life of the street supporter phenomenon as a commodity situation. Central to this process 
was the dramatic increase in the quantity and prominence of World Cup coverage between late 
May and early July, 2002. The media coverage soon reached saturation level: on the evening of 
Korea’s shock victory against Portugal, Koreans were bombarded with almost two hours of 
euphoric World Cup coverage in prime time news, and over a dozen articles from both Chosun Ilbo 
and Donga Ilbo the next morning. It was an extraordinary moment removed from many 
conventions of media discourse, wherein the significance invested in the victory was used to justify 
a temporal and spatial demarcation of such a ‘special scene’, and the unusual act of eschewing 
‘real’ news for euphoric celebration was normalised.
126
 Significantly, the new commodity situation 
that emerged as the street support phenomenon was coterminous with this extraordinary moment. 
In the same way that the ‘World Cup fever’ normalised the news media’s celebrations, it generated 
a bewildering environment which imposed its own rhythms of consumption.
127
 For however 
persistent and unrelenting the coverage seemed to be, there was in fact a ‘rhythm’ of crests and 
troughs that established systems of anticipation, progression and investment on the part of the 
audience. The audience gradually came to internalise this rhythm of consumption and learnt to 
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enjoy its pleasures. This rhythm was in fact more effective at captivating the audience than a 
chaotic and unceasing bombardment of information, because it could accommodate varying 
degrees of enthusiasm and consumption. It was not so much a heavy-handed inculcation of 
consuming subjects, but rather a relationship of consumption wherein the consumer possesses a 
degree of agency in the choice of specific commodities and interpretations, even as these choices 
are inflected by the ever-present clamour and logic of this rhythm. 
 
The print media were particularly characterised by this rhythm, in part due to the rigidity in their 
format and structure. Based loosely on regular, sports coverage, newspapers built their coverage 
around three basic ‘phases’, using each Korean match as a focal point. By focusing on the matches, 
the rhythm of coverage was complemented by the rhythm of the tournament itself. Two or three 
days before the match, a ‘build-up’ phase would set the interpretive framework for the coming 
match, introducing narratives and roles such as player milestones or subplots of rivalry and 
revenge.
128
 On the 4
th
 of June, for instance, Donga Ilbo anticipated Korea’s World Cup match 
against Portugal that night with a front page cover story, “Making the myth of Incheon: Korean 
football’s fateful clash against Portugal”.
129
 It went on to provide subplots for the upcoming match, 
such as the rivalry between Ahn Jung-Hwan and Pauleta, largely invented by the article itself. 
Anecdotes about excited street supporters were also a key part of the build-up phase, as shown by 
the following article which appeared the day before Korea’s match against Poland: 
 
“Many office workers were busy looking up various football-related news during the 
day, and looking for locations with giant screens to watch the game and support the 
team. 
 
Park Sŏng-Soo (32, office worker, Seoul) said: ‘I’m already anxious, because the Poland 
match is the most important in qualifying for the knockout rounds... I’ve been busy 
looking up places to support, and I’ve decided on Sejong-ro so now I have to let all my 
friends know. 
 
Restaurants were also busy preparing for the game, with various promotions on hand. 
One family restaurant in Apgujŏngdong has offered a free glass of beer every time 
Korea scores, and has prepared by ordering in 8 barrels of beer and putting all 
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employees on alert.”
130
 
 
These stories in the build-up phase operated to produce an imaginary of an excited, optimistic, 
positive and unified Korea and, alongside it, a continuous and composite grand narrative of the 
Korean team’s adventures. The former was a sense of a totality of festival that compelled 
participation, directly or through consumption of media texts, while the latter provided an 
emotional investment in the ongoing narrative, again encouraging individuals to return to the 
World Cup and media coverage of it to satisfy that investment. The myriad of statistical, historical, 
anecdotal and symbolic elements referenced was of secondary importance: what mattered for the 
media was to produce stories adhering to familiar narrative frameworks, and encouraging 
enthusiasm and national identification. For instance, the media positioned the match between 
Korea and Italy as a rematch of North Korea’s famous victory in the 1966 World Cup, thereby 
applying an extra layer of narrative interest into the coverage. It seemed to matter little that the 
victory in question had been achieved by South Korea’s ‘other Self’.  
 
Immediately following each match, media coverage would reach its climax. The newspapers 
devoted the majority of their pages to reports on the match, as did prime time television news 
programs. These often attempted to convey the raw sense of euphoria during the match itself, and 
used the momentous occasion to indulge in figurative and heightened language. Following Korea’s 
victory over Poland, the Chosun Ilbo and Donga Ilbo covered their first few pages with ecstatic 
proclamations of victory: 
 
“We have finally done it. The dream of a World Cup victory. Korea’s taeguk warriors 
defied Poland’s ferocious attacks to grind out a priceless victory. Hwang Sun-Hong’s 
opening goal was absolutely brilliant, and Yoo Sang-Chul’s second half goal finished 
them off completely. 47 million citizens celebrated, and the Red Devils and street 
supporters’ cheers pierced the skies. We had not known just how sweet the taste of a 
World Cup victory would be.”
131
 
 
“We won. We won 2-0. The first World Cup finals victory that we so craved – that 
precious dream is now reality. How long have we waited for this? It is a proud victory 
for the t’aeguk warriors, drenched in sweat after 90 minutes of desperate struggle. It is 
also a victory for all citizens who, in the Pusan Asiad stadium, by the giant screens in 
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Seoul’s Sejong-ro, and in homes all over the country, all became Red Devils and 
screamed ‘p’ilsŭng K’oria’...”
132
  
 
Direct and explicit language was used to wax lyrical on ‘our victory’. After Korean victories, 
discourses of national pride and solidarity came to the fore more than at any other point during 
the World Cup. This triumphant and totalising discourse was grounded in the textual content of the 
earlier build-up phase, which had set the interpretive framework in such terms. The euphoric 
discourse of national success and dramatic victory then completed - for the moment - the 
production of an imagined Korea and the story of the Korean team. The Korean media encouraged 
the audience to indulge themselves in feelings of optimism, triumph and pride, and simultaneously 
provided the means by which to do so. To this effect, the Korean media sought to satisfy the 
constantly diminishing desire to relive the memories and sensations of the match and maximise 
the return of audience interest on their investment. This comprised the ‘evaluative’ phase, where 
the various narratives and themes surrounding the game were revisited from various angles. 
Typically, these consisted of the following: ‘football’ stories mobilising the discourse of the sport 
for a technical analysis of the match; ‘personal’ stories discussing milestones, achievements and 
other vagaries of an individual player or coach’s experience; ‘exotic’ stories of eccentric and 
unusual events related to the match; and finally, stories that examined the impact of the match in 
terms of Korean nationality. These ‘evaluative’ texts sustained the audience’s interest, and 
provided a connection between one match and the next. For instance, the following articles were 
published after Korea’s matches against Poland and the United States, respectively, and used the 
template of a ‘personal’ story: 
 
“Jung Ji-Won (32) had been watching her husband’s match in Pusan’s Asiad stadium. 
And when Hwang Sun-Hong’s shot crashed into the Polish net, she burst into tears. ‘I 
was in tears throughout the first half, because I kept remembering all the 
disappointments my husband has had to experience in past World Cups’, said Jung. ‘He 
called me five minutes before the match and said not to worry, that he’s feeling great 
today...”
133
 
 
“Hwang Sun-Hong suddenly felt dizzy. The area next to his right eye had struck hard 
against the back of Hadjuk’s head, and a stream of blood flowed from it. Hwang 
wrapped bandages tightly around his head and ran. The eye was swollen and 
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throbbing, but he could not afford to slow down. He jumped higher for the ball, and 
eagerly probed the American goal. The 40
th
 minute. Finally, a chance...”
134
 
 
The first article about Hwang and his wife captures them in an intimate setting, while the second 
achieves a similar effect by narrating the recent match from Hwang’s point of view. These texts, 
though a few days apart, work in tandem to cultivate an emotional investment in Hwang’s progress 
as well as that of the Korean team, creating connections of significance that inculcate the viewer 
into the rhythm of the media spectacle. Every stage of the cycle created narrative connections to 
the stage before and after itself: once readers had, through consumption, committed themselves 
emotionally, these connections provided them a reason to anticipate the next stage. For just as the 
cycle of build-up, match reports and evaluation closed, another would open up for the next match. 
Even for sporadic, half-interested consumers, the cycle was regular and familiar enough to allow 
them to keep abreast of developments, and at any time, re-enter the flow of stories. The rhythm of 
the stories imposed an order on the coverage that facilitated consumption at all levels.  
 
Most significantly, the imposition of such a structure represented the dictation of commodity logic 
over the content of the news. The rhythm was a spectacular mechanism: it was devoted to the 
production of maximum entertainment and the cultivation of a persistent environment of 
consumption. The media channels and industry workers had more or less independently worked 
according to a logic of maximising the commodity situation at hand. This commodity logic had then, 
on a wider scale, organically produced a rhythmic spectacle whose effect was to produce the 
audience as subjects of Korean nationality, and in turn satisfy the passionate attachment of that 
subject. 
 
The mechanisms of commodity spectacles transformed the World Cup and the street supporting 
phenomenon in other ways. As mentioned above, one of the most memorable aspects of the 
phenomenon was the emergence of the ‘t’aegŭkki fashion’. Prior to the tournament, the t’aegŭkki 
had occupied a position in the public mindset more akin to the American national anthem than to 
the American flag: respected, but not loved. Amongst the street supporters, however, the sporting 
tradition of wearing striking supporting attire had taken an extreme form, as they manipulated the 
t’aegŭkki and other symbols of Korean nationality to produce face-paints, bandanas, capes and 
other fashion items. This presented extremely attractive potential for a commodity situation in the 
context of news and entertainment media. On one hand, t’aegŭkki fashion provided a wealth of 
visually striking and attractive images, ranging from comically eccentric accoutrements to the sight 
                                           
134
 “hwang sŏn-hong ‘pungdaet’uhon’... mimunjŏn nubyŏ” (Hwang Sun-Hong’s wounded heroics... probing 
the American goal), Chosun Ilbo, 11 June 2002. General section. 
R e d  D e v i l s :  A f f i r m a t i o n s  o f  N a t i o n a l i t y  | 52 
 
of scantily clad young women: at the same time, the immediate association with discourses of 
nationality and patriotism made it commodifiable in a different way, creating a product that was at 
once sensual and ideological. As such, there was a certain duality in the ways in which this trend 
was reported by the media. Firstly, the media imposed an interpretive framework of an evolution 
in Korean nationality. The media frequently argued that the trend represented familiar yet new and 
modern form of Korean identity, and that traditional patriotism could coexist with the 
individualism of contemporary society.  
 
“The t’aegŭkki, formerly a symbol of authority and solemnity, was used by the youth 
this World Cup as a great way to express their patriotism... One of the great 
achievements of this World Cup is that the taboo regarding the t’aegŭkki was broken, 
and has become a very familiar figure. I’m sure that even after the World Cup, our 
youths will roam the streets proudly sporting the t’aegŭkki on their t-shirts, as 
opposed to the American flag or the Union Jack...”
135
 
 
Combined with academics and other institutionally authorised ‘experts’ mobilised to provide 
opinions, the media narrative effected an articulation between a sense of the sacred and the 
fashion of the street supporters. Yet alongside this discourse of national evolution was another 
system of signification: this patriotic narrative was accompanied by striking images of t’aegŭkki 
fashion that, even by itself, spoke a different language of fashion, bodily aesthetic and social capital 
to the younger generations. A small hint of such a multiplicity can be found in a television program, 
where two young male street supporters are interviewed on the spot: 
 
Reporter:  Why are you wearing the t’aegŭkki? 
Supporter A: To look cool. 
Supporter B:  Argh, no! If you say that – can you edit that out? [pause] To wear 
the t’aegŭkki means that the nation is in our hearts. This nation – 
from the nation, this nation- 
Host:  He’s a bit overexcited, isn’t he? *laugh* 
Supporter B: -so we’re all being united through the t’aegŭkki! At this rate 
reunification [between North and South Korea] won’t be a 
problem!  
Reporter:  But you wouldn’t have worn it before. 
Supporter B: Of course not. How could we wear it? But now, it’s the World Cup! 
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Reporter:  Do you now feel more patriotic? 
Supporter B: Absolutely – and it’s because of the World Cup!
136
 
 
When Supporter A initially gives a matter-of-fact answer, ‘to look cool’ (or ‘to stand out’), 
Supporter B hastily silences him, implying not that he is wrong but that his frank cynicism is 
inappropriate for television. Supporter B then gives an excited and possibly ironic performance 
that echoes the media discourse of patriotism and national evolution. In fact, the desire to join in 
celebrations, to avoid missing out, to ‘look cool’ and stand out, perhaps to preen for their female 
counterparts, were all significant factors in their decision-making: at the same time, the knowledge 
that they were participating in a celebration of Korean nationality would have reassured them and 
justified their actions, and added to the sense of satisfaction. The truth was probably an 
ambiguous mixture of both that even the boys themselves would be hard pressed to extricate from 
each other. The two discourses and logics did not have to be, and were not, completely 
cooperative: t’aegŭkki fashion became a polysemic signifier that was leveraged by both discourses, 
producing an ambiguous blend of nationality and commodity spectacle that enabled looking and 
feeling good at the same time.
137
 All this was symptomatic of the overall mechanism of 
entertainment spectacle. It was a seductive mechanism by which existing and familiar fields of 
consumption could appropriate discourses of nationality and justify consumption, rendering it 
simultaneously more attractive and more satisfying. This is not to say that the ‘sacred’ nature of 
nationality and the particularities of its discourse were lost; rather, ideas about Korean nationality 
were asserted and championed through the consumption of a commodity spectacle.  
 
The t’aegŭkki fashion was the street supporters’ way of appropriating the imagery of the Red 
Devils and the discourse of nationality for the purposes of consumption. Meanwhile, businesses 
and enterprising private citizens were forming a booming market for Red Devils and World Cup 
merchandise. Whether in the form of promotions for large corporations, mass-produced souvenirs 
from professional businesses, or handmade flags peddled by street vendors, individuals and 
businesses rapidly moved to identify and satisfy the fetishistic desire to consume this 
entertainment spectacle. The commodity potential that they capitalised on was, literally, public 
enthusiasm and ecstasy:  
 
Reporter:  “When do you get the most customers? 
Street Vendor: “Well, after the first half, when you get to the second half, we [Korea] 
gotta smash them two-nil! That’s where the money’s at.” 
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Reporter: “That means that whether Korea wins or loses really determines 
whether  
 they go home happy or not. When the Korean team wins, they can  
double or triple their profits, but if it’s a draw or a loss, they could 
even lose money.”
138
 
 
Like the rhythm of media coverage, the pervasive attraction of merchandise extended the lived 
experience of street support, allowing the consumer to enjoy the spectacle at all times and in all 
ways. The time and space of the potential consumer were colonised by other commercial interests 
as well. Celebrities held concerts and shows at scenes of street support, or used media interest to 
their advantage by allowing themselves to be photographed at matches or in the streets. 
Corporate advertisements during this period drew extensively on images and sounds of the Red 
Devils and street supporters as a performative discourse of their desired corporate image – most 
commonly familiar and chic, and/or patriotic and ethical. These various forms of commodification 
did not originate from a single source: a number of fields and industries operated independently 
under the logic of the commodity. Inadvertently, but unsurprisingly, their efforts collaborated, 
despite possible contradictions or contestations in 
minor matters, to form a pervasive entertainment 
spectacle.
139
 
 
Curiously, one of the most important reasons why 
the Red Devils and the street supporting 
phenomenon had such powerful potential for 
commodification was that they were seemingly not 
commodified: the media could provide a plausible 
illusion that the act of street supporting was not 
‘tainted’ by commercial interests, and was instead 
grounded in a sacred sense of nationality. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, this was a Lacanian 
‘universal Lie’
140
 at work. In general, the Korean 
subject, being founded on a passionate attachment 
committed to the ideology of Korean nationality, 
could not wholly reject or subvert the dominant 
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discourse of national pride and celebration that was so intimately linked with the spectacle at 
hand.
141
 The sense of the ‘sacred’ in nationality, therefore, was critical to the popularity and 
desirability of the entertainment spectacle that built up around it. No matter how spectacular and 
commodified manifestations of the Red Devils and street support became, there had to be a 
discursive performance that said ‘to consume this spectacle is to participate in a celebration, 
affirmation and revitalisation of Korea and Korean-ness’. The discourse of nationality acted as the 
‘face’ of the entertainment spectacle. For many Koreans, it was more ‘natural’ to accept and 
consume the spectacle to fulfill their passionate attachment to their own identity as Koreans than 
to reject it and risk questioning their own subjectivity.
142
  
 
In this context, it is not surprising that the Red Devils’ refusal to themselves capitalise on this 
commodity potential aided their commodification. Despite resisting official sponsorship deals or 
corporate and political affiliations, they did not, and realistically could not, stop all those who used 
their name, logos and visuals without authorisation, allowing a huge variety of ‘Red Devils’ 
advertisements and merchandise to proliferate.
143
 Thus a paradoxical relationship between the Red 
Devils the group and the Red Devils as a commodity was in operation: on one level, the visual, 
aural and symbolic elements of the Red Devils could be endlessly commodified, while on the other, 
the Red Devils as a group were still seen as pure and free of commercial interests. One of the most 
successful attempts at balancing the sense of the sacred with 
the logic of the commodity was an advertising campaign run 
by SK Telecom in mid-2002. As the only exception (at the time) 
to the Red Devils’ stand against commodification, SK Telecom 
secured the rights to use the Red Devils in their campaign in 
exchange for provision of operational funds.
144
 In Diagram E, a 
typical SK Telecom advertisement can be seen using the colour 
red, the ‘Be the Reds’ t-shirt and close-ups of screaming 
supporters as dominant visual components, with the words 
‘Shout, tae-han-min-guk! Sing, o-p’ilsŭng K’oria!’ along the 
top.
145
 A variant added in a large t’aegŭkki for additional effect 
(Diagram F)
146
. The company also held live promotional events 
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such as the ‘Red Devils Support Parade’, distributing red shirts and balloons and instructing the 
public in the Red Devils’ supporting conventions. In these advertisements and events, SK Telecom 
avoided prominent use of product placement or other direct means of advertising: rather, they 
simply ensured the association of their company image with the Red Devils’ visual signifiers and 
forms of support. In this way, SK Telecom was able to preserve the sense of the sacred as much as 
possible, and appropriate it for the commercial purposes of brand image and awareness. 
 
Despite this accommodation, the eventual fate of the Red Devils showed how fragile this balance 
was, and how easily the illusion of the sacred could be broken. In 2002, the Red Devils’ strong 
commitment to resist capitalising on their popularity and influence contributed to their powerful 
commodity potential. But the enormous growth in their popularity and prominence and the rise of 
external commercial interests began to transform the organisation. For the 2006 and 2010 World 
Cups, beset with challenges presented by an enormous membership and the pressure of holding 
bigger and better supporting campaigns, the Red Devils’ management accepted several lucrative 
offers for corporate sponsorship, and also derived income from the sale of shirts and other 
supporting paraphernalia – items they had distributed without cost in 2002. The Red Devils and 
their sponsors also took to promoting new chants and songs for every World Cup, in order to 
produce new advertisements and merchandise. The result was that while street support continued 
to be a popular spectacle in these two subsequent World Cups, the Red Devils were no longer 
synonymous with the street supporters or the Korean nation as a whole as they had been in 2002. 
By 2010, some were even calling for its disbanding, arguing that the large-scale celebrations that 
had originally defined the group in such positive terms had now become a signifier of their 
commodification.
147
 The illusion that the Red Devils were ‘pure’ manifestations of a sacred Korean 
nationality had been broken by excessively explicit forms of commodification, and the logic of the 
commodity overwhelmed the discourse of sacred nationality. This rift was thrown into light by a 
media controversy regarding conflicts between the Red Devils and casual supporters during the 
2010 World Cup: 
 
“...but many [street supporters] have reported unpleasant experiences while 
supporting out in the streets. This is because some supporters’ groups are said to be 
‘hogging’ space in public viewing areas, discriminating against those who are not 
members, and because supporting is turning too commercial and losing its heart... 
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...there was a restricted area in the Seoul plaza reminiscent of the DMZ [Demilitarised 
Zone]. This was dividing the Red Devils and the ordinary citizens. The Red Devils had 
taken up what is called the ‘royal seats’ – the best places to watch the match from – 
and one of their sub-groups, called ‘Real Red’, had stopped ordinary citizens from 
joining in... Following this, there is growing criticism that the Red Devils supporters are 
treating our national football team’s matches as theirs and theirs alone.”
148
 
 
A gap had grown between the Red Devils and ‘ordinary citizens’; while the individual experience of 
the entertainment spectacle remained, it had become unmoored from its original code of 
signification, and grown hollow. The discourse of unity and solidarity that spoke so strongly to 
Koreans, for whom the nation is still divided, had lost its legitimacy. The Red Devils’ transgression 
was not necessarily their involvement in commodification, which was in fact an important part of 
their activities in 2002 as well. The issue was that their involvement could now be interpreted 
predominantly in terms of commercial exploitation, through a type of discourse that was mostly 
foreclosed by the media in 2002. When the sense of euphoria that had dominated media discourse 
was replaced by an explicit discourse of commodity and spectacle, the Red Devils were no longer 
as attractive a commodity or viable as a signifier of Korean nationality. The life of the Red Devils 
and street supporters as an entertainment spectacle shows that many spectacular commodities do 
not operate by themselves: even as their practical operations are guided by the logic of the 
commodity, they rely on the performance of a different kind of discourse – in this case, the belief 
that Korea is great, Korea is something to be proud of, and that Korea is being born again. 
 
 
A New Korea 
 
The mechanical operations of the media coverage of the Red Devils and street supporters as a 
spectacle had produced a consolidated and consistent discourse of Korean nationality that 
generated understandings of Korea’s place in the world, what it meant to be Korean and what was 
happening to Korea through the World Cup. This discourse used the 2002 World Cup to herald 
Korea’s progress, and put forward an imaginary ‘New’ Korea – a series of positive, future-oriented 
affirmations that reassured Koreans of their subjective foundation and renewed the disciplinary 
power of that subjectivity. 
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This process was characterised by a number of different techniques. One was periodisation, or 
demarcation: the World Cup, as a ‘mega-event’, was used to draw a narrative trajectory of progress, 
from ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Korea.
149
 This meant that the ‘Old’ Korea, while not condemned, was attributed 
with various imperfections and flaws. On the other hand, media coverage, in its praise of a new 
Korea, implied a Korea that had been held back and was yet to reach its full potential. The ‘New’, 
post-World Cup Korea was meant to heal these blemishes and help Korea to fulfill its destiny. The 
below post-World Cup feature from Chosun Ilbo was just one of many media texts that celebrated 
this development, and helped establish it as truth in the public consciousness. 
 
“The sight of hundreds of thousands of people gathering, and then cleaning up before 
returning home in an orderly fashion, was a source of amazement for many 
foreigners...after the Italy match, Lee Sŏng-Wŏn (18, Sŏil High School) helped clean up 
after the street supporters with his friends. ‘We enjoyed the supporting – now is the 
time to clean up’, he said. Those who could remember the 1988 Olympics’ 
[government-initiated] campaigns like ‘let’s not hang our washing in the windows’ for 
homes between the Kimpo airport and Seoul could only be amazed at how times had 
changed... By participating voluntarily, maintaining public order and celebrating our 
victory, Koreans’ civic mentality developed into a sense of pride. These proud Koreans 
made a giant step forward into becoming global citizens in their own right”
150
 
 
“The World Cup street support has brought our neighbours together. The experience 
has brought together apartment dwellers, who had barely known who was living next 
door, to become like a family. While the players bonded together to defend on the 
pitch, our neighbours were also all about teamwork, dividing the tasks into teams like 
‘screen team’, ‘food team’ and ‘supporter team’.”
151
 
 
Rubbish-collecting volunteers, neighbourhood communities and other organs of orderliness and 
community were commonly used by the media to advocate a newfound sense of civic 
responsibility and brotherhood in Korea, and dispel fears that the rapid urbanisation and 
technological advances of the preceding decades was producing an increasingly selfish, isolated 
and blasé populace. The journalists employed emotive language throughout to frame this idea not 
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in terms of administration and government, but a humanising transformation in the Korean people. 
This use of language even extended to the use of quotes. It is common practice in the Korean 
media to edit or paraphrase direct quotations without notice, often standardising the language 
variations in speech levels and regional variants into a homogenised register. In the above case, the 
Chosun Ilbo placed poetic phrases in the street supporters’ mouths: the teenager’s statement 
would not be out of place in the very public order campaigns that the journalist proclaims now 
obsolete. Other articles were even more explicit in their periodisation: 
 
“It was exactly 15 years ago. These same streets, on the 10
th
 of June, 1987. It was the 
same day, and the same place, where the ‘June Democratic Movement’ began, with 
cries of ‘abolish the [fascist] constitution’ and ‘we want our vote’. The frightening 
visage of policemen guarded these streets: the area near the Anglican cathedral was 
completely shut off. But in exactly the same place, we were now joining our voices to 
cry ‘tae-han-min-guk’ and ‘o-p’ilsŭng K’oria’. And I saw the birth of a new generation, 
full of confidence and pride.”  
 
As shown above, many of these articles constructed a collective memory of nationwide protests 
against the military dictatorship in the 1980’s in such a way that they provide a useful contrast 
between the old and new. This is particularly significant in the light of how memory of Japanese 
imperial rule had shaped Koreans’ discourse of Korean-ness in previous decades, to the point 
where negative characteristics of the Korean people, such as cronyism and nepotism, were 
perpetuated by the Japanese and internalised by the Koreans as the reason for their subjugated 
status.
152
 The difference was that the periodising discourses involved a more confident and 
optimistic construction of collective memory, where the technique of demarcation could be used 
to overcome enduring ideas about Korean flaws, and the street support could be presented as 
both catalyst for and evidence of Korea overcoming its traumatic history. This discourse, I suggest, 
was a reflection of emerging generations who had no direct experience of Japanese rule or military 
dictatorship and were exposed to the results of rapid economic growth and increasing global 
cultural influences – generations that the ‘New Korea’ purported to represent.  
 
The World Cup was therefore used to establish a chronology of national transformation, and in 
turn naturalise an exclusion of undesirable elements and qualities from the index of normative 
Korean nationality. This technique was not new: Kim Young-Sam’s presidential campaign in the 
early 1990’s had promised to cure the ‘Korean disease’, which might include “all that was wrong 
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with the Korean society and the Korean state”.
153
 The difference was that the World Cup as an 
entertainment spectacle had been able to produce a level of enthusiasm and participation that 
made the discourse more compelling than any political speeches could have been. There was a 
sense that Korea had simultaneously embraced new and exciting characteristics to become a 
‘better’ Korea than it had ever been, and revitalise traditional characteristics to realise the Korea 
that always should have been. 
 
The discourses that brought into being this ‘New Korea’ were consolidated around the idea of the 
‘W Generation’, or ‘World Cup Generation’. Also called the ‘R Generation’ for ‘Red’, this term 
emerged in the media in mid-June, and by end of the month was being used broadly. This 
technique of interpellation helped identify, from the events of the street support phenomenon, a 
specific entity that could be named and referenced – and one which had already built up a corpus 
of symbolic signifiers and ideologies. The interpellation of the W Generation embodied the ‘new 
Korea’ that had been demarcated from earlier periods: the characteristics of this emerging entity, 
such as voluntary participation, orderliness, confidence in individual expression and ‘pure’ national 
pride, were depicted as representing a new national identity ‘cleansed’ of the political agendas and 
revolutionary mindset of the previous decades’ democratic movements.  
 
“A new human race was born in Korea, June 2002 – the World Cup (W) Generation. 
Ranging from late teens to twenties, they were armed with a kind of confidence that 
could not be found in older generations. Experts concluded that they brought the joys 
of play and voluntary participation to a people mired in a group mentality of self-
sacrifice.”
154
 
 
“They [the W Generation] drew the t’aegŭkki on their faces, wrapped it around their 
bodies, and poured into the streets. They confidently expressed what they like and 
what they don’t like...  the defeatist mentality, the cynicism and resentment of the 
older generations were nowhere to be seen.”
155
 
 
This optimistic, future-oriented discourse actively disassociated the younger generation from pre-
existing tropes of individualism and political apathy to which they had often been subjected: in fact, 
the descriptions of the W Generation’s ‘joy of play’ and ‘voluntary participation’ inverted them into 
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positive tropes.
156
 These processes had two key implications. The first, more obviously, involved a 
production of an optimistic future for Korea and Koreans that targeted a desire to be globalised, 
but to feel that Korean nationality remained relevant. The second carried the subtle implication 
that pre-W Generation Korea was problematic. ‘Old’ Koreans in these descriptions are seen as 
oppressed, violent and resentful; this retroactive definition tapped into more banal discourses of 
self-deprecation and critique common to many nationalities. A similar discursive technique had in 
fact been used by the government at the time, whose ‘Bright Smile Movement’ campaign 
simultaneously told Koreans they were not perceived as very friendly, and then offered to educate 
them on the performance of friendliness.
157
 In light of this problematisation, the new Korea was 
defined as a transcendent Korea, and/or a Korea which had restored a quintessence imagined to 
have been present in the past. Once again, the ambiguous and therefore flexible mixture of both 
narratives allowed for a vague yet enduring imagination of Korean progress. Within this grand 
narrative, the W Generation came to personify discourses of nationality that articulated what 
Korea is, what Korea is becoming and what Korea should be. The descriptions of the W Generation 
show how such concepts joined to form a taxonomy of associated ideas.  
 
This taxonomy derived its power to establish itself as a regime of truth from emotive language that 
invoked the audience’s passionate attachment to a Korean identity. Journalists laid aside 
conventions of impartiality, such as the controlled expression and tone of a news anchor or the use 
of ‘dry’ language, and indulged in dramatisation. The columns of Cha Bum-Keun, a Korean football 
legend, exemplified the ways in which the media communicated, and thus amplified, excitement 
and pride:  
 
“How... 
Did this really happen? 
Dear God... 
Bring it on! 
Bring on Spain!!!!! 
[...] 
What you went through to give us this joy. You spent so long with your eyes only on 
the ball. What other footballer in the world could have done the same? The stars of 
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Europe? They could never do it. Never...”
158
 
 
Having begun with technical and professional analyses of football tactics merely weeks earlier, 
Cha’s columns soon shed their professional language, air of impartiality and even the formatting 
conventions of newspaper articles. Written during the World Cup, these outbursts of joy were all 
the more convincing for their hyperbole, as they gave voice to and amplified the excitement in the 
audience. These were followed by equally poetic evaluations after the tournament, as the media 
reappropriated this emotion and gave it a nostalgic and historical form. The first few days after the 
World Cup final saw a series of almost identical documentaries about the Korean team’s journey 
from both major national broadcasters. These documentaries’ solemn eulogies of the events had 
worked to create memories for the audience. One such documentary combined epic, orchestral 
music, slow dissolving montages of national visual motifs, a trembling female voice and even a 
poem to provoke an inspirational and respectful passion for South Korean nationality.
159
 Their 
hyperbolic language constantly pushed the narratives to become ‘larger than life’, compelling an 
understanding of the Korean team and the street supporters not as footballers and football fans, 
but something more. Another television program even injected an aesthetic sense of heroism into 
shots of Korean footballers in training, using a combination of rain-misted cameras, close-ups, slow 
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motion, piano music and poetic narration (Photo G):
160
 
 
“Their road to the knockout rounds was long, but not in vain. They had a coach who 
recognised their ability, and teammates to share their sweat and laughter. The training 
on that day, on the rainy ground, would remain in their minds long after they had 
left.”
161
 
 
This emotive language referenced a sacred element in Korean subjectivity – that is, love of ’our’ 
nation. Specific elements, such as the current state of society or particular facets of Korean 
mentality, could be isolated and criticised, but not the basic passionate attachment to the abstract 
notion of ‘Korea’, of ‘our nation’. This reference helped foreclose negative or disjunctive 
interpretation of this national transformation: the W Generation’s provocative outfits, wild 
manipulation of the t’aegŭkki and unashamed passion for play could potentially have been 
interpreted as an erosion of traditional Korean values or the development of an ‘un-Korean’ Korea. 
Instead, the discourses of national transformation, both in its periodisation and its interpellation of 
the ‘W Generation’, had the effect of reaffirming the validity of Korean nationality for its subjects.  
 
This affirmation also had a disciplinary aspect. The inverse of national pride and identification is 
coercive normalisation. The media ensured that the 2002 World Cup, and the discourses of 
nationality around it, could not be ignored. Not only were they given an inordinate level of 
attention and exposure, almost all of that exposure was positive and imperative. The media texts 
depicted a Korea where everyone was an excited street supporter, proud of Korea, and supportive 
of the World Cup as a whole. A discourse of solidarity swept the media landscape: it was perhaps 
not as iconic as the ‘W Generation’ or the images of t’aegŭkki fashion, but it was even more 
pervasive. Journalists and media commentators often applauded the emergence of a happy 
solidarity demonstrated voluntarily by all Koreans. Articles combined the aforementioned 
techniques of periodisation and interpellation with this idea of solidarity: 
 
“Solidarity was often forced on us. To have the same hair, to wear the same clothes, to 
see the world with the same eyes, to judge things by the same standard – that was 
supposed to make us one... we didn’t really know what ‘becoming one’ meant. We just 
thought, vaguely, that to become one was becoming the same as each other. 
 
In June 2002, we were one in our difference... they [the street supporters] kitted out 
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with unique red clothes, painted their bodies, carried mobile phones blaring supporter 
chants and rode roller blades. They scribbled messages on the sacred t’aegŭkki, 
donned it like capes and bandanas... they generated an amazing energy and made us 
truly one. Soon, their youthful image became the face of all Koreans.”
162
 
 
There was, again, a juxtaposition of the forced solidarity of the military dictatorships, where the 
threat of violence-induced sameness, with the voluntary solidarity of the W Generation, who freely 
engages in patriotic acts. But this discourse of freedom was illusory: it masked an implicit and 
disciplinary power that rendered this new solidarity ‘forced’ in different ways.
163
 In fact, these 
celebratory texts contributed to a disciplinary influence by building media discourses that stressed 
solidarity and ‘sacred’ nationality – a subjectivating spectacle of oneness.
164
 The discourse of 
Korean triumph, a new Korea, the W Generation, a new solidarity – these all masked the 
commercial aspect of the phenomenon and its mechanisms as an entertainment spectacle. 
Although most Koreans had direct contact with the phenomenon, they were only able to see a 
small part of a chaotic whole: as such, the media played an important role in formulating this 
collective imaginary of a revolution of the sacred into a new generation of nationalism. Alternative 
interpretations having been foreclosed, the Korean subject was compelled to accept this idea of 
national transformation. To deride the street support, to be cynical of Korea’s success, was to place 
oneself outside the redrawn boundaries of Korean normality.   
 
Ultimately, it is difficult to be completely cynical about the idea that the Red Devils and street 
supporters were spontaneous, liberating, and untainted by commercial interests. It cannot be denied 
that Korean subjects at the time were moved by an understanding of and belief in a ‘sacred’ 
nationality, which reaffirmed the validity, quality and legitimacy of Korean nationality. But the 
spectacle – that pervasive network of commodification and consumption – was not merely the 
instrument by which this nationality was manifest. Taking after McLuhan’s old adage that the ‘medium 
is the message’, the spectacle rearranged elements of nationality into modular signifiers as it 
appropriated them. The existing systems were unanchored and reorganised to produce spectacular, 
commodified manifestations of nationality, embodied in scenes of street support. The t’aegŭkki, the 
Korean flag exemplified this process: its historical origins, its common context of use and appearance, 
its visual form and its social capital were extended, transformed and redesignated by not only the 
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street supporters themselves, but by the media and businesses as well. 
 
Therefore, the street support phenomenon cannot be understood as a simple transformation of 
Korean nationality along a linear trajectory - from beleaguered under the Japanese, to rigid and 
abused under military dictatorship, to finally free and individualistic with the ‘W Generation’. It was, 
rather, a displacement of Korean nationality from the realm of the ‘sacred’ to the realm of the 
spectacle, wherein the body becomes a site for the performance of identity, the symbol is removed 
from its origins, multiplied and used for its own sake, and the act of consumption emerges as the most 
powerful and familiar demonstration of approval and preference. This is how we can understand and 
conceptualise the extraordinary phenomenon of the Red Devils and street support in a way that does 
not ignore or distort its two most striking aspects: the claim to and attachment to the sacred, and the 
mechanisms of spectacle and commodity around it. Both were real and significant forces that moved 
the emotions and behaviour of the consumer-subject. Spectacular nationality did not mean the end of 
its sacred allure nor passionate attachment to it. Rather, it implied a transformation of the ways in 
which it was produced and consumed, and introduced the media as a key integrated and naturalised 
mechanism. The media coverage of the Red Devils and street supporters showed that the idea of 
sacred and pure nationality could retain its legitimacy and influence in the passionately attached 
subjects, even while elements of that nationality were reconstructed to maximise their commodity 
potential. The spectacle, in fact, might even complement ‘sacred’ nationality, by making it more 
attractive, more familiar and more compelling. 
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4. The Global: Nationality and the Double-Sided Gaze 
 
The phenomenon of the Red Devils and the street supporters involved a positive, internally 
oriented assertion of South Korean nationality. It was an attempt to define and produce Korean 
nationality in terms of knowledge specific to its subjects and legitimise it in their own terms. But 
Korean nationality does not exist in a vacuum: it is shaped through relationships of both inclusion 
and exclusion, and the affirmation of what it is is always accompanied by the rejection of what it is 
not – the Other as referent.
165
 During the 2002 World Cup, Koreans were acutely aware that the 
eyes of the world were watching. The government and media, as with the Olympics, proclaimed 
the event an opportunity to advertise Korea to the world, and gave optimistic projections about 
the impact it would have on Korea’s economy and reputation. The high profile debates on the 
challenges of globalisation in the mid-late 1990’s had also contributed to a pervasive impression of 
Korean nationality on the world stage during the tournament. 
 
This sense of the panoptic visibility of Korea was encouraged by the media. Their coverage at the 
time demonstrates a constant fretting over external opinion that entailed a discursive invocation 
of a foreign gaze that would inform the ways in which Korean nationality was described, 
performed and communicated. I suggest that a ‘double-sided gaze’ operated in the media 
discourse of Korean nationality during the 2002 World Cup, wherein Korean subjects were 
constantly made to gaze back to the foreign Other – or rather, an imaginary Other of their own 
making – in order to determine what was desirable and valuable for themselves. This gaze worked 
to position Korea within a wider significative context of the global: consequently, the ‘Other’ 
would come to play a crucial role in the production of the Korean Self. 
 
The operations of this double-sided gaze, and its implications for the way nationality was 
produced and understood, were perhaps most clearly demonstrated through the remarkable case 
of Guus Hiddink. As a Dutch manager of the Korean national football team, Hiddink was used as a 
site for discourses of nationality that both championed Korea by condemning the Other and 
validated Korea through the Other’s approval. Guus Hiddink’s career in the Korean media shows 
that concepts of Korean-ness and foreign-ness are not ‘primordial’, but fluid discursive 
constructions that can be manipulated. Nationality does not provide a base category that 
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irrevocably differentiates the Korean and the foreign and from which all other distinctions emerge. 
Rather, nationality as a taxonomic system is a collective imaginary fuelled by media narratives, 
positioned and defined against the simulacrum of other nationalities.  
 
 
The Landscape of the Global 
 
This complex relationship was grounded in, and symptomatic of, a particular understanding of the 
global. The global refers to not only contemporary debates on globalisation, but the various non-
Korean nationalities which act as the Other. This concept was consistently employed as a 
discursive technique in Korean media coverage of the 2002 World Cup. In other words, a set of 
familiar discursive constructs defined the global, positioned Korean nationality in relation to the 
global, and produced ideal norms and subjective values. 
 
That the ‘global’ should have featured prominently in discussions of a mega-event such as the 
World Cup is not surprising. Host nations of modern mega-events have regarded them as 
opportunities to assess their reputation in the eyes of the world and exert a transformative 
influence over that reputation. The liberal use of motifs from Mediterranean Sea myths in the 
1992 Barcelona Olympics employed the same logic as the Korean government’s designation of 
‘Olympic food’ in 1988, and the Chinese government’s programs to train its citizens in queuing for 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In each case, the host country identified the mega-event as a 
mechanism by which extremely large audiences can be mobilised into a positive celebration of 
nationality.
166
 At the same time, other nationalities were appropriated to produce a backdrop of 
national characteristics against which the host nationality could be positioned.  Throughout the 
2002 World Cup, the media constantly developed sets of terminology and narrative roles that 
harked back to universal ideas and categories. These simplified, archetypical dichotomies included 
the contrast between African physical prowess and European technical sophistication,
167
 and the 
use of players such as Beckham and Ronaldo to create iconic motifs that could stand in for entire 
nationalities.
168
 The majority of nationalities were integrated into this taxonomic system, enabling 
a standard of comparison and judgment that could then be applied to categorise and make sense 
of those nationalities. The range of archetypes and the flexibility of discourses involved meant that, 
if required, the host nationality could be positioned so that comparison with other nationalities 
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would legitimise and favour it. In the context of Korean media coverage during the 2002 World 
Cup, characteristics attributed to foreign nationalities were frequently invoked in order to justify 
and promote Korean nationality.  
 
At the same time, other nations employ the technique of categorisation to make sense of host 
countries during mega-events. One study of American media coverage of the 1988 Seoul Olympics 
showed how nationhood could be distilled into a single narrative model – in this case, of war. 
Despite the fact that thirty-five years had passed since the armistice, the Korean War was still the 
defining framework by which the media presented Korea.
169
 The images in the U.S. coverage were 
a collection of scattered, ambiguous and non-explicit signs that, through sustained consumption, 
were stitched together to form vague but entrenched impressions of Korean nationality. Host 
nations, however, are becoming more aware of such processes, and are employing increasingly 
sophisticated techniques to leverage the attention of the world more effectively. For the 2002 
World Cup, the Korean government and media employed high-level policy directives, special 
government committees, information campaigns, hospitality education programs and so on for 
this purpose - techniques that have since been taken up by, for instance, South Africa and India for 
the 2010 World Cup and 2010 Commonwealth Games. The ambition and hope for an 
improvement in ‘global standing’ inspired constant invocations of the non-Korean Other, which 
would in turn determine what it meant to be ‘Korean’. Throughout the 2002 World Cup, the media 
consistently acknowledged and promoted the belief that the world was watching Korea, and Korea 
needed to impress those watching. The Korean nationality produced through this media coverage 
was a performance oriented towards a global Other.
170
 
 
This outward-looking gaze was also motivated by Korea’s complex relationship with globalisation - 
the phenomenon of trans-local movements of people, capital, products and ideas.
171
 Some 
theorists have suggested that globalisation will precipitate the erosion or even the destruction of 
the nation-state, and the subjective influence nationality exerted over its subjects. Certainly, in the 
case of Korea, fears of ‘Americanisation’ and the agricultural sector’s fierce opposition to free 
trade agreements had given the idea of a dichotomy between globalisation and nationalism some 
weight. However, such a model does not fully reflect the ways in which globalisation is understood 
and the meaning it holds for Korean nationality. By 2002, globalisation was regarded as both an 
opportunity for and a threat to Korean nationality. In the 1990’s, Kim Young-Sam, Korea’s first 
democratically elected civilian president, had run on an election platform of ‘Creating a New 
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Korea’ (shinhan’guk changjo). This slogan eventually came to revolve around the idea of 
globalisation, or ‘segyehwa’, an overarching initiative that called for more interaction with the 
world across economic, political, cultural and social fields. This discourse of national 
transformation and evolution integrated the debates on globalisation by presenting it as not 
merely the best, but the only route for Korea.
172
 It tacitly but powerfully argued that isolationism 
was not an option, and helped establish a belief that globalisation was inevitable and Korea had to 
adapt in order to prosper.
173
 This belief has lasted long after Kim and his policies, despite the 
traumatic experience of the 1997 Asian economic crisis.  
 
This dominance of the ideology of globalisation, however, did not represent the subservience of 
the local to the global: rather, it was a case of Korea’s deep-seated and powerful nationalism 
appropriating discourses of globalisation for its own purposes. Shin Gi-Wook claims that “most 
Koreans appear to see no inherent contradiction between nationalism and globalisation. Rather, 
they seek to appropriate globalisation for nationalist goals.”
 174
  Shin argues that this appropriation 
has been motivated by a social Darwinist belief that globalisation presents an ‘evolutionary’ 
challenge for nation-states that must be met. I suggest that such a motivation is at once optimistic 
and pessimistic: the Korean embrace of globalisation hopes for the expansion of Korean culture 
and industry onto the global stage, just as it fears their destruction under foreign influences. In 
addition to this uneasy relationship was a deep-seated tendency for Korea to see itself as an 
underdog. Originating from a series of traumatic experiences including Japanese conquest, poverty, 
civil war and military dictatorship, it involved a defensive mentality and a constant urge to prove 
Korea’s legitimacy. During the 2002 World Cup, the Korean media told the story of the national 
football team as that of underdogs, overcoming all odds to prove doubters wrong, and a parallel 
tale of Korea as a small nation that could compete with the ‘best’ in the world. This defiant 
mentality helped to consolidate Korean ethno-nationalism in the face of globalising forces, as well 
as adopt globalisation and the global as an opportunity for the export and validation of Korean 
nationality. All in all, the Korean media’s discussion of Korean nationality during the 2002 World 
Cup took place against a global backdrop, and through frequent and prominent invocations of the 
discourse of globalisation. Nationalities from across the globe provided the Other by which the 
Korean ‘Self’ could be evaluated, and the belief that such an evaluation was both valid and 
desirable. In such a discursive framework, globalisation was not something to be justified, but 
itself a justification for other decisions and arguments. 
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A Hierarchy of Nationality 
 
Specifically, the media frequently invoked a prevalent and powerful signifier in contemporary 
Korea: that of the sŏnjin’guk. Loosely translated as ‘elite nation’ or ‘advanced nation’, sŏnjin’guk is 
ambiguous in its specific characteristics but as a whole a very resonant idea in Korean society. 
Countries described by the term sŏnjin’guk are perceived as not just rich, but ‘advanced’ in areas 
such as civil liberties, democratic institutions, economic strength, political and diplomatic 
influence and quality of life. Over time, popular stereotypes such as the cultural sophistication of 
the French or the diligent industry of the Germans have played a significant role in determining 
which nations are sŏnjin’guk, as well as what defines a sŏnjin’guk in the first place. The sŏnjin’guk 
provides both a point of reference and the gold standard in contemporary Korean society, and was 
frequently invoked by the media during the 2002 World Cup in this manner:  
 
“There are many factors that will decide this World Cup’s success. The first is that this 
World Cup needs to be judged as better prepared and better hosted than any other. In 
particular, Korea’s involvement will be very carefully compared against that of co-hosts 
Japan. It is crucial that this World Cup is used to make the world recognise very clearly 
that we are a sŏnjin’guk.”
175
 
 
This article, in anticipation of the World Cup, argued that Koreans could use the tournament to 
make the world at large recognise Korea as a sŏnjin’guk. Not only was the notion of sŏnjin’guk 
established as something to aspire to, the achievement of those aspirations was to be judged by 
external recognition. For this reason, the press and broadcast media frequently reported on the 
way various sŏnjin’guk were talking about Korea during the tournament. Excerpts like the 
following were very common: 
 
“A British daily, the Guardian, introduced Ahn Jung-Hwan (26, Perugia) as Korea’s 
leading player. Ahn was introduced 22
nd
 in a feature called ‘Rising Stars’, which 
introduced players with the potential to catch the eyes of the world through this World 
Cup...”
176
 
 
Football was integrated into this comparative matrix of national characteristics. In another 
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example, the words of Roger Lemerre, the French manager, were mobilised as an authoritative 
statement on the quality of the Korean team: 
 
“Korea’s fighting mentality was truly amazing... France was pushed back by Korea’s 
attack. The truth is that we were not strong enough when fighting for the ball... We 
did not even imagine that Korea would come out and show such fighting spirit...”
177
 
 
These quotes are of particular interest because of the way they were ‘cropped’ from the interview 
as a whole, and because of decisions made in their translation. Comparisons with English 
renderings show significant differences. The Independent’s version, for instance, reported 
Lemerre’s comments about Korea’s attacking prowess and strength as follows: 
"We have had to fight hard to cope with the skills, with the physical challenge 
proposed by the Koreans and with their strong will. But we never gave it up and we 
managed to win in the end."
178
 
The Chosun Ilbo’s comments emphasised Korea’s successes, and implied that their performance on 
the day was superior to France’s. The Independent’s version appeared to use mostly the same 
sections of the interview, but implied that the Korean team, despite their hard work, never 
seriously threatened the French. Meanwhile, the BBC used different and much shorter sections of 
the interview, producing yet another version of Lemerre’s comments.
179
 The Chosun Ilbo 
emphasised Lemerre’s praise of the Korean team, translated them in a more positive manner than 
their foreign counterparts had, and excluded ambiguous or unfavourable comments. The 
translation even used the Korean word ‘hwaiting’, a borrowing from  the English ‘fighting’ that has 
come to carry the connotation of maintaining a fighting spirit and has no direct correlative in 
English or French. This was not so much an act of sabotage or dishonesty – selective quoting is 
commonplace in the media – but a way for the Korean media to emphasise that a sŏnjin’guk 
manager recognised Korean excellence. 
 
In general, media texts show how sŏnjin’guk were mobilised as supporting examples that justify a 
core argument about Korean society, and how the legitimacy of these advanced nations in that 
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role was foreclosed. This is an extension of the relationship between the local and global discussed 
above. The constant reference to sŏnjin’guk bears similarities to the postcolonial gaze, wherein 
the ‘colonised’ internalises the perspective of the coloniser, and comes to perceive itself as inferior 
and in need of the coloniser’s civilisation. The implicit and foreclosed acceptance of the standards 
set by sŏnjin’guk makes Koreans not a passive object of external forces that establish the 
sŏnjin’guk standard, but a willing subject who - as the Korean journalists do above - actively work 
to identify the standards by which subjection occurs. On the other hand, the optimistic and even 
defiantly confident tone in the above excerpts suggests that there is more to this process than 
subordination. Korea is consistently depicted as a nation that is not inherently inferior to 
sŏnjin’guk, but one that should and can surpass sŏnjin’guk by their own standards - a nation 
whose potential merely awaits realisation. The Koreans are thus positioned as underdogs, looking 
up to the superior sŏnjin’guk, but this inferiority is also portrayed as transitory. In fact, as the 
World Cup progressed and the Korean national team achieved remarkable success on the football 
pitch, the discursive role of sŏnjin’guk began to shift. Korea was increasingly placed in a superior 
position, where it was able to bask in its newfound status. When the Italians expressed outrage at 
the controversial manner in which they were defeated by Korea, the Korean media belittled their 
arguments, largely dismissing them as paranoid inventions of bitter losers. One opinion column, 
headlined “Italy, take a look in the mirror”, adopted a particularly patronising tone: discussing the 
Italian club Perugia’s threat to terminate Korean player Ahn Jung-Hwan’s contract for knocking 
Italy out of the World Cup, it argued that Ahn should leave Perugia and move on to a “bigger 
stage”, and implied that Italy was no longer a football sŏnjin’guk.
180
 Korea’s victory over a 
sŏnjin’guk was thus used to reposition Korea, leading to more confident and bullish coverage for 
the latter stages of the tournament.
181
 Such a discourse of confident assertion presaged a longer-
term effect that the Korean team’s achievement would have in the collective imagination of 
nationality. 
 
The idea of the sŏnjin’guk is therefore part of a graduated field of nationalities, a hierarchic grid 
wherein each nationality and each national characteristic is imbued with a given level of capital. 
This relationship between Korean nationality and sŏnjin’guk as a whole was only one of many 
instances of relative positioning. Japan, in particular, was a special case for Koreans to consider: 
not only had Japan submitted Korea to its rule only decades before, but Japan had since emerged 
as an economic superpower, widely recognised as the leading Asian nation in many ways. The co-
hosting arrangement for the 2002 World Cup therefore had potential for a special kind of tension, 
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with Koreans loathe to be outdone by their neighbours on the world stage. Japan and Japanese 
nationality was thus simultaneously an object of revilement,
182
 an object of admiration and a rival 
in competition – an Other that functioned in more ways than just as a sŏnjin’guk.  The media texts’ 
references to Japan during the 2002 World Cup reflected this complex relationship. On one hand, 
journalists reported stories of positive Japanese recognition of Korea to show that the World Cup 
had brought the two nations together: the media depicted a Japan that supported Korea, admired 
Korea’s performance as a host, and voluntary participated in celebrating Korea.
183
 On the other 
hand, signs of Korean superiority over Japan were gleefully reported as evidence of Korea’s 
progress. When Japan was knocked out of the World Cup before Korea, the discourse adopted a 
touch of the patronising attitude seen in the discussion of the Italians.
184
  
 
The Korean relationship with the sŏnjin’guk formed only one part of this graduated hierarchy of 
nationalities; relationships with other Asian nations, for instance, were strongly inflected by a 
belief in Korea as a regional leader. In the media coverage of the 2002 World Cup, the idea of the 
‘exotic’ provided a useful general framework in which other nationalities, advanced and otherwise, 
could be understood. The exotic is a technique familiar to media spectacles around the world, 
wherein signifiers of global nationalities are appropriated for the production of the exotic as a 
spectacular commodity.
185
 The Korean coverage of the World Cup was filled with sights of 
supporters and football all over the globe that conformed to pre-existing Korean stereotypes of 
the strange and exotic. The television media often combined this gamut of exoticness with 
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narrative themes of the ‘brotherhood of man’ and the ‘global village’: 
 
“A message of peace was fired, not from Europe or the Americas, but Asia, and echoed 
around the whole world through the World Cup. The tournament’s message of a world 
in harmony was expressed through the Asian philosophy of mutual understanding.”
186
 
 
This excerpt was typical of media discourse at the time: the World Cup’s universal values, such as 
peace and harmony, were integrated with perceptions of Asian and particularly Korean values. 
Various cultures around the world were used to support this depiction. In most cases, the media’s 
depiction of foreign nationalities was achieved by first eliciting awe from the audience over the 
exotic, then reassuring them that an essential sameness can be found in these strange places 
through narration, personal stories and so on. One documentary’s coverage of Senegalese football 
fans begins with images of an African urban landscape: a worker drives a horse-driven wagon on a 
dirt track adjacent to a covered highway (Photo A).
187
 After a brief historical overview, the program 
stresses that “for them [the Senegalese], football was hope.”
188
 As traditional African music plays 
in the background, slow-motion close ups of Senegal’s winning goal against France are shown, 
followed by scenes of euphoria in Senegal (Photo B).
189
 This structure first defines Senegal by a 
readily recognisable difference between ‘Africa’ and Korea, then, using the slogan-like phrase 
‘football was hope’ as a turning point, depicts Senegal in terms of such universal values as 
solidarity. In the images of celebrating Senegalese, the audience is reassured of not only the 
universality of these emotions, but also the importance of football, and the legitimacy of their 
own emotional investment in the World Cup and Korean nationality. At the same time, at the level 
of media consumption, the exoticity of the Senegalese provides entertainment, satisfying a ‘quest 
for novelty’ as a source of commodity potential.
190
 
 
One explanation for the production of these exotic national archetypes was that the World Cup 
presented a bewildering variety of national cultures, histories and narratives that had to be 
organised into familiar caricatures for the consumer. The exotic must be different, but not so 
complex or alienating in its difference as to be incomprehensible or repulsive. In the same 
documentary, the Senegalese are introduced with reference to the ‘Black Continent’: this verbal 
invocation of Africa combines with images of dilapidated buildings and the sound of pounding 
drums to produce an immediately identifiable blend of poverty and primal energy that typifies 
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caricatures of modern Africa. It is no different with a sŏnjin’guk such as France. Coverage of French 
supporters in the same documentary begins and ends with shots of champagne; the laid back, 
middle-class supporters provide an equally typical image of France as a land of culture, wine and 
sophistication. Their disappointed but collected demeanour following the defeat illustrates a 
‘disinterested interest’
191
, excising the violent hooligans and racism that plague contemporary 
French football. Such a depiction established a contrast between ‘cultured’ French spectatorship 
and the chaotic, frenzied Senegalese celebrations. These exotic archetypes of nationalities were 
then able to be different, but in a way that was immediately understandable: not the truly Other, 
which was incomprehensible, but the deviant Other.
192
 This happy confluence of difference and 
sameness made these archetypes attractive as spectacular commodities: as Debord has argued, 
they were presenting a myriad of consumable differences that nevertheless give evidence for 
universality.
193
 As the example of France demonstrates, the exotic and the sŏnjin’guk are not 
mutually exclusive. The ubiquitous gaze of the camera commodified every nationality at hand – 
including Korean – for consumption that would simultaneously entertain and reassure.  
 
 
The Double-Sided Gaze 
 
The discourse of globalisation and the symbolic landscape of global nationalities were key 
influences in the production of Korean nationality during the 2002 World Cup. The Korean 
nationality that emerged from this 
context was performative and 
spectacular, founded on an impression 
of panoptic visibility. It was 
encapsulated by a basic but powerful 
mantra repeated by the Korean media – 
‘the world is watching us’. To the right 
(Photo C)
194
 is a typical image from the 
time: a foreign journalist trains his 
camera on the Korean masses. The gaze 
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of the foreigner, or rather, the Korean awareness of that gaze, rendered Koreans’ actions a 
performance of nationality. “Vision itself became a kind of discipline,”
195
 wherein the Korean host 
imagined and spoke into being a visitor-inspector whose existence exhorted Koreans to 
performances of nationality, and whose standards and judgments were projected onto it by the 
hosts themselves. The media spectacle of nationalities was a crucial element that enabled the 
production of such an Other, which in turn motivated Koreans to perform their nationality.
196
   
 
One of the most prominent and explicit ways in which this disciplinary power was enacted was in 
the discourse of hospitality. During the World Cup, the Korean press demonstrated unusual levels 
of directness by exhorting its citizens to improve their behaviour for the event and to be good 
hosts. The chief motivation was to improve Korea’s standing in the eyes of the world – a purpose 
built on the assumption that Korea would benefit from meeting ‘global’ standards, and that doing 
so would help the nation ‘go forward’.  
 
“As we prepare the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup, what might foreigners be thinking 
about our country? I worry that just as we think of the dark days of Franco’s 
dictatorship with Spain, they might think of Korea’s military dictatorship and street 
protests, and the [1997 Asian] financial crisis. The World Cup will attract the attention 
of the entire world – I think it will be a unique opportunity to show Korea’s 
transformation and the way Korea really is. By demonstrating a friendly and orderly 
civic mentality, the public can spread the image of a Korea that one would want to 
visit again, a Korea that leads the new information age.”
197
 
 
“In contrast to what Koreans might have hoped, foreigners’ images of Korea were 
often negative, such as that it is a ‘divided country’ or ‘a country with unstable 
economy and politics’. The ’88 Olympics raised awareness about Korea, but could not 
change this image. But the Korea-Japan World Cup is providing an opportunity to 
change this. Journalists and expatriates all over the world are saying that the World 
Cup is the first time there’s been so much positive news about Korea.”
198
 
 
In these articles, the question ‘what do others think of us?’ frames the entire discussion. A 
problem is identified (Korea’s current image), a solution is provided, and a call for action is made 
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(public order and etiquette). The majority of the media coverage involving national image adhered 
to this general format, and conceptualised hospitality as a test for the Korean nation. This 
discourse was consciously produced by the media and other institutional sources, such as 
academia and the government. It was grounded in the idea of the global and the implicit 
normality of Western civil society – with the sŏnjin’guk the ideal: 
 
“The difference between a sŏnjin’guk and a hujin’guk [primitive, backward nation] can 
be one of economic or military power, but the most important standard is that of civic 
responsibility. It is expressed through manners and refinement, which are most visibly 
represented through what might be called ‘basic public order’. ‘Say sorry when you 
bump into someone’, ‘no spitting in the streets’, and ‘keep the noise down in 
restaurants’ – putting just these three things into practice can upgrade Korea to 
another level.”
199
 
 
Deviations from this ideal were labeled as ‘backward' in order to establish a graduated field of 
normality, and imply the need for Korea to aspire towards the standards of a sŏnjin’guk, in this 
case, public order and social etiquette. The Korean imagination of citizens of the sŏnjin’guk and 
what they might find appropriate dictated instructions on how Koreans should host visitors. In 
essence, the Koreans were being asked to internalise an imaginary gaze positioned at an external 
origin.  
 
That a process of collective imagination was involved did not make the idea any less real or 
effective. The media constantly communicated a sense of visibility and external surveillance, and, 
while it would not have been internalised completely, it undoubtedly contributed to heightened 
efforts on the part of Koreans to act hospitably which was appreciated by no small number of 
foreigners. Thus, “it is too naïve to regard the cleaning process as a proof of increasing social 
consciousness or civic ethics in South Korea. By promoting and participating in the street cleanings, 
citizens embodied a nationalism that was symbolic with their global desires and disciplined by the 
global gaze.”
200
 Therefore, ‘Korean-ness’ during the World Cup produced a form of Korean 
subjectivity that established the subject around the central figure of Korean nationality, but 
mobilised the external Other in order to construct this centre. 
201
 Nationality thus involved a 
certain duality, wherein it was produced for consumption of the Korean subject as well as the 
Other. Media discourses of national image, national progress and the World Cup as a global 
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festival therefore looked both inward, to preexisting conceptions of Korean nationality, and 
outward, to both projected standards of sŏnjin’guk and the forces of globalisation. In this manner, 
a passionate attachment to Korean nationality was encouraged: matrices of normativity were 
formulated which induced the Korean subject’s desire to perform and promote Korean nationality. 
202
 
 
To sum up, the characteristics of the double-sided gaze, in this particular case, are as follows. 
Firstly, as discussed above, it looked to an internal system of values and phenomena to assert that 
the Korean ‘Self’ was valid, valuable and normal, but relied on standards derived from the ‘Other’ 
to justify this assertion. This can be seen in the way Koreans frequently refer to Korea and Koreans 
as ‘urinara’ (our country) and ‘urinara saramdeul’ (our people), respectively: this ethnic-
nationalistic Self is clearly demarcated from the Other, and retains a sense of autonomous identity 
even as it is defined in relation to the Other. Secondly, the Self’s relationship with the foreign 
Other was simultaneously aggressive –  establishing the validity and superiority of the Korean ‘Us’ 
through unfavourable comparisons – and self-deprecating, recognising the sŏnjin Other as the 
standard to be met. The gaze therefore mobilises the Other in such a way that Korean nationality 
in the present is justified, and a narrative of progress oriented around an ideal Korea is presented. 
Finally, the media constructed a collective imaginary of the ‘Other’, a Baudrilliardian simulacrum 
that is more ‘real’ than the real Other. There were undoubtedly direct contributions from foreign 
sources regarding impressions of Korea, but Korean media discourse of the Other far superseded 
this ‘primary evidence’. When colonially minded photographers point their camera at indigenous 
peoples, they use the framing power of that gaze to directly manipulate the visual representation 
of their subjects. In this case, however, the subjects of the gaze themselves changed and adjusted 
their behaviour for the camera, seeking to manipulate their own image through an external gaze. 
 
This relationship with and appropriation of the Other cannot be easily tracked by a linear narrative 
of national progress, from a primitive nation to an advanced and superior one. It is undeniable 
that for Korea, the turn of the millennium was a time when the defensive mentality regarding 
Japan and all things Japanese, inspired equally by the traumatic experience of annexation and a 
keenly felt inferiority complex, was fading as younger generations came of age and Korea 
advanced economically.  But as the operations of the double-sided gaze show, this emerging 
national confidence was not predicated on a disavowal of the superiority of the sŏnjin’guk. Rather, 
it was a peculiar manifestation of hybridity;
203
 threatened with displacement by the advent of 
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globalisation, Korean nationality responded by appropriating foreign standards and methods for 
its own ideological purposes, all the while deploying assertive discourse that located it in a 
position of the challenger. As a challenger to sŏnjin’guk, Korea is positioned in such a way that the 
temporary superiority of sŏnjin’guk can be recognised (thereby authorising the external gaze of 
the foreign Other) without contradicting the discourse of national transcendence. In this context, 
descriptions of Korea and the Korean team as an underdog implied a transitory state, wherein it 
could, at any moment, rise above its current station.  
 
Finally, the media was the primary site for all of these discursive deployments. Even as individuals’ 
personal experience of foreign nationalities increases as a result of globalization, the media 
continue to play a crucial role in shaping impressions of this Other, and the Self in the reflection of 
that Other. As the simulacrum “substitut[es] signs of the real for the real itself,”
 204
 so narrative 
models in the media spectacle shape how the foreign Other, and by extension, the Self are 
understood.  
 
 
Guus Hiddink 
 
The cult of worship around Guus Hiddink, the manager of the Korean national football team, was 
one of the key features in Korean media coverage of the 2002 World Cup. In his initial months he 
was vilified, and in that process, became an uncomprehending Other who did not belong to 
Korean society; yet by the end of Korea’s successful World Cup performance, that foreignness had 
been partially erased and transformed, redefining him as a champion of Korean values. The story 
of Guus Hiddink, and the trajectory of his public image, is perhaps the most telling example of this 
landscape of the global, and the double-sided gaze.   
 
In January 2001, the Korean Football Association appointed Guus Hiddink as the manager of the 
South Korean national football team. On one hand, his glittering credentials and his home nation 
of the Netherlands – a ‘football sŏnjin’guk’ – backed up his appointment: on the other, his 
foreignness was a risk in itself, for both Hiddink and the KFA. A national sports team assumes an 
importance that renders it a direct representative of the nation as a whole, and its successes and 
failures become a projection of that nation’s position and progress. The idea that a foreigner 
should take charge of that entity provokes discomfort for many nations: in England following the 
2006 and 2010 World Cups, the media and public lambasted their Swedish and Italian managers 
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and called for an ‘English manager for an English team’. The same treatment could equally have 
befallen Hiddink. 
 
The first few months of Hiddink’s reign indeed appeared to follow such a pattern. Because of a 
relatively sparse schedule, the few matches that the Korean team did play in came under intense 
scrutiny: one great or terrible performance could attract the attention of the media and the public, 
and vindicate or condemn the entire team.  When the Korean team succumbed to two humiliating 
5-0 defeats against France and the Czech Republic in May and August 2001, these matches were 
symbolically invested as icons of failure attracting and validating criticism of Hiddink and the 
Korean team. Chosun Ilbo journalists later recounted that “from this point on, Hiddink and his 
team begin to tread a thorny path”. People began to mock Hiddink by the name of odaeyŏng, 
which  means ‘five-nil’, but can also be read as a typical Korean name.
205
 Following the second 5-0 
defeat, a current affairs program held a panel debate titled “Team Hiddink: Is This OK?” The 
program opened by assuring the viewers that it was not out to blame Hiddink for the loss: 
 
Host: “I’d like to begin by assuring you that this [blaming Hiddink] is not the case 
at all. We are here today to discuss... what we – the football association, 
Hiddink, the players, the public – can do in the remaining time to get a good 
result at the World Cup...”
206
 
 
This caveat was in effect a pre-emptive gesture to defend the program’s direction: journalists and 
commentators were acutely aware that their criticisms could in turn be interpreted as a failure to 
support the Korean team, and by extension, the national cause.  In fact, the program and its host 
clearly and consistently performed two discursive functions: firstly, they established and defended 
the idea that these defeats represented a clear failure. The provocative program title was followed 
by a montage of the team’s recent defeats, and the questions asked of the panel presupposed 
issues that had to be resolved: the debate was structured around topics such as “Why are we 
weak against Europe?” and “Are there no problems with Team Hiddink?” When the guests began 
to provide optimistic and defensive responses that argued Team Hiddink was ‘OK’, the host 
interjected and drove the discussion back to the ‘problem’: 
 
Panelist:  “In particular, the 5-0 [result] against the Czech Republic should not be 
considered as anything more than a friendly match... the score may have 
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been 5-0, but I could find many positive things to take from that match.”  
 
Host:  “ [smiling] Even so, 5-0 is a fairly embarrassing result in a first team match... 
there’s not a lot of time left, and some people are saying, how long can this 
go on? Please point out some problems as well.”
207
 
 
Secondly, the program consistently problematised Hiddink’s leadership as the reason for that 
failure. This is, on the surface, a natural course of action: he was the coach, and his assumption of 
the position was the major recent change in Korean football. But more significantly, the program 
was discursively isolating and locating the Korean team’s flaws and problems within the person of 
Hiddink – his profile, his actions, his policies. Comparisons with Philippe Troussier, the French 
manager of the Japanese team, also demonstrated the competitive anxiety regarding Japan.  The 
football experts on the panel pointed to Hiddink’s lack of knowledge about Korean culture and 
players, as well as his excessive physical training, as stumbling blocks in the Korean team’s World 
Cup bid: 
 
Panelist:  “To manage a Korean team, you need to understand Korean culture: and to 
direct that team’s tactics, I think you need to be able to at least say basic 
football terms [in Korean]... we need to see that kind of effort, or signs of 
that effort [from Hiddink.]”
208
 
 
For several months, Hiddink continued to be the target of negative media coverage. In February 
2002, the Gold Cup had just ended, and “Hiddink became embroiled in the ‘girlfriend controversy’. 
It was made known that his girlfriend Elizabeth had stayed in the same hotel as the national team 
during the Gold Cup...the controversy overlapped with the news of lacklustre results at the Gold 
Cup, and became larger.”
209
 The mainstream media generally interpreted this as a sign of 
immorality rather than cultural difference, and argued that it represented Hiddink’s failure to 
conform to Korean expectations and conventions: for Korean society at the time, unmarried 
relationships at such an age were unusual at best, and romantic relationships were considered a 
strictly private affair that should not be allowed to interfere with public duties.
210
 In such ways, 
subtle commentary on Hiddink’s foreignness underlined criticism of his performance, locating his 
foreignness as an inevitable weakness or flaw. In other words, the latent possibility for 
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unfavourable interpretation in Hiddink’s persona and actions was now mobilised in the wake of a 
need for criticism and blame. Later events proved that these very characteristics that were 
criticised could just as easily be erased from media discourse, or even transformed into highly 
positive factors.  
 
The transformation of Hiddink into a national hero happened quickly. As late as early 2002, the 
possibility of a new manager was discussed: but as the World Cup loomed closer the media 
criticism suddenly ebbed. In March 2002, Chosun Ilbo published a column that lambasted Hiddink 
for his excuses: only two weeks later, they were celebrating Korea’s encouraging friendly results by 
suggesting Hiddink had been right all along. Then in May 2002, three matches provided the 
catalyst for a total transformation: the Korean team had given a markedly superior performance 
against Scotland, England and France, the latter two firmly recognised as ‘football sŏnjin’guk’. It 
did not matter that only one of these matches was a victory, or that they were non-competitive 
matches: they performed the same role of the iconic catalyst that the 5-0 defeats had. Hiddink was 
suddenly becoming acclaimed as a genius, and the Korean team a success story. 
 
“Guus Hiddink was nicknamed ‘odaeyŏng’ [five-nil] after losing to France 5-0 in last 
[2001] May’s Confederations Cup... but through the friendlies against England and 
France, he has been reborn. His predictions came true, and the Korean team was 
reborn into a powerful team. Hiddink is now being marked out as the man who will 
turn the World Cup upside down... the criticisms of ‘odaeyŏng’ are now nowhere to be 
found. These days he is called ‘He thinks’, after the sound of ‘Hiddink’.”
211
 
 
This article was published on the 28
th
 of May, three days before the start of the World Cup. Just 
before the tournament, the media had completed the reversal of its depiction of Guus Hiddink. 
The journalist’s confident assertion that the nickname ‘odaeyŏng’ is “nowhere to be found” 
indicated that the negative image of Hiddink was not simply receding, but completely rejected. 
This rapid transformation was inspired by the Korean team’s improved performances on the pitch: 
at the same time, it seemed likely that the media, independently, determined that criticism so 
close to the World Cup would likely be received as destructive and unpatriotic, and at odds with 
the general atmosphere of celebration they wished to promote. Finally, on the 4
th
 of June, Korea 
defeated Poland 2-0, completing this symbolic transformation. This victory was clear-cut and 
comfortable (rather than controversial), extremely prominent, and an event in which a great deal 
of importance and emotion had been invested. It was, after all, the first South Korean victory in 
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the history of the World Cup, and came on the back of humiliating defeats in previous 
tournaments that had been interpreted as representing the nation’s inability to compete on the 
world stage. It greatly amplified the optimism and respect surrounding Hiddink: through a series 
of prominent events functioning as catalyst, the media discourse first produced Hiddink the villain, 
then transformed him into Hiddink the national hero. 
 
 
The Hiddink Syndrome 
 
The ‘Hiddink Syndrome’ emerged in Korean society in late May 2002, and reigned as a dominant 
trend and news story until Hiddink’s resignation in early July. Its primary characteristic was the 
production of Hiddink not only as an object of admiration, but an object who was admired 
through consumption.  Firstly, Hiddink accrued an abnormally high level of social capital through 
both the success of his team and the media narrative of his beliefs and behaviour: negative 
interpretations of Hiddink, or denunciations of the positive interpretations, were nearly 
completely foreclosed from the public sphere.
212
 Secondly, consumption, whether of media texts 
or consumer products, was offered as a way to not only learn more about Hiddink, but identify 
oneself with him. In short, a Hiddink fandom had been born. Throughout June and July, the media 
invested their resources into every kind of coverage regarding Guus Hiddink: 
 
"During the Poland match, he made 3 ‘uppercuts’ after Hwang Sun-Hong’s opener, but 
was checked by the assistant referee as he approached the field. Then there were two 
uppercuts after Yoo Sang-Chul’s 
goal: I thought that was it, but 
when the final whistle blew he was 
at it again.“
213
 
 
“If I stand on the sidelines, I can 
hear conversations between 
Hiddink and the players. ‘Kihyŏni, 
what are you doing now? Move!’ 
‘Mengbo, very good.’ ‘ppali ppali 
[hurry hurry].’ Hiddink’s orders 
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switch seamlessly between harsh barks and warm praises.”
214
 
 
His every action and gesture was tracked and reported by the press. Quirks such as his ‘uppercut 
punch’ goal ceremony, or his shortened nicknames for Korean players, were fondly reported by 
the media and extrapolated to form an image of a witty and passionate, as well as driven and 
diligent, character.
215
 Through both direct and indirect means, the media coverage was building a 
set of dispositions and signifiers assigned to and constitutive of Hiddink as a public figure. 
Hiddink’s visual identity was, to a large extent, defined by these signs: the thoughtful frown, the 
firm and outstretched thumbs-up and the ‘uppercut’ goal celebration created a persona which 
encouraged respect as well as empathy. During and after the 2002 World Cup, Hiddink featured in 
several Korean corporate advertisements which made full use of these visual signifiers. One such 
advertisement opens with a close-up of Hiddink, with his hand on his chin and sporting his 
‘trademark’ frown. The drum beat of the tae-han-min-guk chant and excited narration identifies 
the setting as a football match, and as the narration builds to a climactic scream to announce a 
goal, Hiddink is seen celebrating with his uppercut gesture (Photo D)
216
. He calls over the goal 
scorer in excitement – and into his arms jumps a pizza delivery boy, sporting the company’s pizza 
box. Though references are made to the context of football, it is in fact Hiddink’s authentic 
performance of his own visual identity that provides the advertisement with its commodity value. 
The process of aestheticisation played a key part in mobilising Hiddink as a commodity situation, 
by producing him in terms of signifiers which were immediately identifiable, yet nonspecific in 
their ideological or philosophical disposition. These powerful yet ‘emptied’ signifiers could then be 
employed across a wide range of commodities. 
 
This visual identity was supplemented by media narratives of his personal life and history, which 
mobilised the operative logics of celebrity culture to again maximise Hiddink’s potential as a 
spectacular commodity. Hiddink’s ‘story’ thus emerged through an intersection of familiar 
narrative models that drew on every available detail from his life:  
 
“Hiddink likes to eat spaghetti. Salad and cheese are a must, as well. He’s not 
especially fond of Korean food, but seems to like a few dishes, like kalbi [ribs]. Oh, and 
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he is a cappuccino maniac. I’m told he drinks one after every meal.”
217
 
 
“Hiddink’s hometown is Doetinchem, a small country town two hours by car from 
Amsterdam. Though he is now a manager of international reputation, Hiddink was 
relatively unknown during his playing days. But in Doetinchem, he is a legendary 
figure. At the age of 21, he began his football career with the local club, De 
Graafschap.”
218
 
 
These texts identified and produced Hiddink according to the genres of celebrity culture, historical 
figures, football, nationality and more. Hiddink was being used as a site of a diverse range of 
discursive techniques which entertained their audience by presenting simultaneously compelling 
and familiar narratives. Hiddink had become spectacular, in the sense that his body was invested 
with a rich variety of commodifiable signs and narratives and a great level of cultural capital that 
granted a sense of legitimacy. Very quickly, other social fields within Korea, ranging from political 
parties to small businesses, recognised this commodity potential and began to appropriate 
Hiddink for every kind of product and cause (Photo E, F)
219
: 
 
Narrator:   “Hiddink Syndrome: this time, it’s books. As Team Hiddink reached 
the semi-finals, men and women are busy reading up on Hiddink.”
 
Interviewee: “This is called ‘The Power of Hiddink’, it’s a Hiddink-related book.” 
Narrator:  “Why are you reading it?” 
Interviewee: “Because I’m a fan...” (*laughs*) 
Narrator:  “Another source of the Hiddink Syndrome is none other than a pub. 
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We are told that following the World Cup, a huge number of people 
are looking for beer from Hiddink’s homeland, the 
Netherlands...everywhere we look, there’s Dutch beer on the 
table.”
220
 
 
“Guus Hiddink may have left Korea, but he continues to have an impact even in the 
Financial Services Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service.  On the 8
th
, Lee 
Gŭn-Yŏng, head of the FSS, opened the board meeting by commenting that ‘Hiddink-
style leadership has generated a lot of attention lately’, and said that ‘in the future, 
recruitment of FSS auditors will avoid discrimination by region and schools and focus 
on merit’.”
221
  
 
The policies of the FSS echoed those of a number of corporate and government entities which all 
rushed to adapt Hiddink’s policies and philosophies as best practice – at once a bid to leverage his 
cultural capital for their own ends and a possibility for social change. The Hiddink Syndrome had 
exceeded its original boundaries of sport and Hiddink as an individual. As Hiddink increasingly 
became an ensemble of discursively produced narratives and signifiers, he became more and 
more transposable to different fields and contexts. The discourse of Hiddink suggested that if he 
was a hero and visionary for Korean football, he could be the same for Korean business, politics, 
and more. The logic of the commodity had, through discursive production, organised Hiddink into 
modular and transposable narratives, signifiers and dispositions that could be widely disseminated, 
yet still draw their legitimacy from the social capital attributed to Hiddink as an individual. This 
was notable because it enabled the production of Hiddink as a champion of Korean nationality. 
Hiddink’s significance was no longer confined to his individual popularity: his character, policies, 
principles and achievements were used to map out the potential and future of Korean nationality. 
This is, of course, typical of media-produced national heroes: Zidane and Maradona were also 
subject to the same techniques of aestheticisation and symbolic identification.
222
 The key 
difference was that Hiddink was not Korean, and this would need to be resolved somehow. 
 
 
The Discursive Reconstitution of Hiddink 
 
At a basic level, the discursive transformation of Hiddink into a national hero effectively inverted 
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the techniques that had been used to produce him as an Other and a villain. Yet this rendered 
Hiddink’s foreignness highly problematic: how could a triumphant celebration of a ‘Korean victory’ 
take place while crediting the genius of a foreign manager? After all, as discussed above, the 
media had a vested interest - both as an explicit policy and following the internal logic of their 
business - in promoting the narrative of the World Cup as a triumph of Korean nationality. What 
emerged as a result of these imperatives was a discursive reconstitution of Hiddink. As the 2002 
World Cup progressed, Hiddink’s role as a public figure became a polyvalent vessel of two different 
and seemingly contradictory discourses. Hiddink represented the still prevailing superiority of 
Western scientific method and regimes of truth, while simultaneously affirming the validity of 
quintessentially ‘Korean’ virtues. Hiddink, and the particular ways in which the media produced 
him as a public figure, conflated and converged these two discourses so that far from appearing 
mutually exclusive, they were read as complementary. This allowed the affirmation of Korean 
nationality in the context of its relationship with the global, and specifically, the sŏnjin’guk. 
 
In these two discourses, and in their conflation, media coverage of Hiddink positioned the 
audience in a very specific way. In Foucault’s terms, there was a tactical exercise of power enacted 
through discourse whereby specific relations of power were imprinted on the subject, and the 
subject was in turn compelled to a perspective that re-affirms the truth value of that relation.
223
 
Firstly, the Korean subject was made to acknowledge that the policies, philosophies and methods 
of sŏnjin’guk that Hiddink brought to the Korean team were valid, and by implication, superior to 
existing ones practiced before him. In this case, Hiddink performed the role of a benevolent 
external force, whose knowledge and ability was necessary for the success of the Korean team. 
During and after the World Cup, the Korean media produced a large number of texts that analysed 
the ‘secret’ behind Hiddink’s success in such terms: 
 
“Hiddink accurately identified the problems in Korean football that domestic experts 
could not work out for decades... Using ‘sport scientists’ who specialised in 
physiotherapy and sports physiology, he brought science to Korean football. So far, 
domestic coaches had relied on their eyes to work out how fit a player was.”
224
  
 
“Above all, his man management is a lesson not only for our sports but for our politics 
and society. Taking his post as the national team manager, he picked players strictly on 
merit. No player could be guaranteed a place. Players who showed off but couldn’t 
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pull their weight were boldly removed... the favouritism by region and school that was 
so endemic in Korean football did not fly with Hiddink.”
225
  
 
A focus on the basics, a strict merit-based form of player management, scientific methods – all of 
these factors were described in a way that connected these individual techniques with perceived 
sŏnjin systems of thought and regimes of truth. These advanced technologies and ways of thinking 
were described as overcoming flaws seemingly inherent to the Korean way of things.
226
 As the 
‘Hiddink way’ was transposed across various fields and presented as the solution to many of the 
problems in Korean society, so was this discursive relationship between Korean nationality and 
sŏnjin systems:  
 
“And really, Hiddink has said that he is only a football coach, but when we see him, we 
think, if we had a leader like him in our society, then like our football team reached the 
semi-finals, we [Korean society] too could take a step up.“
227
 
 
This discursive transposition means Hiddink was seen not to have simply ‘fixed’ flaws inherent in 
the Korean team, but by extension showed the ways in which flaws inherent in Korean society 
could be resolved as well.  For instance, Hiddink’s decision to emphasise equality over seniority in 
the team espoused general ideals of scientific method, equality and meritocracy: in vulgar terms, 
the implication was that such ‘advanced’ discipline and logic successfully replaced pre-existing 
Korean corruption, backwardness and inefficiency.  This was not necessarily a full admission of 
Korean inferiority, but a partially submissive discourse whereby sŏnjin tools were credited with 
resolving existing problems in Korean nationality. The Korean subject was thus prompted to 
recognise sŏnjin’guk regimes of truth and to internalise them. 
 
Hiddink’s role, however, was not confined to being the representative of ‘advanced’ technology 
and values. Even as the Korean subject was provided with the explanation that such tools have 
provided Korea with victory, he/she was assured that this success was a triumph of Korean virtues 
and qualities rather than foreign ones. This called to mind a familiar idea in Korea society - ‘tongdo 
sŏgi-ron’, or ‘The Theory of Eastern Ways, Western Technology’, wherein the adaptation of 
Western methods were justified as tools to be subordinated to an Eastern ideology.
 228
 In this way, 
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fears of dependence on the West were assuaged and the viability of an autonomous sovereignty 
assured. This idea allowed the subject - already founded on a passionate attachment to the idea of 
Korean nationality and values - to understand the triumph of the World Cup as a wholly Korean 
achievement, rather than undeservedly granted by external and superior forces. Firstly, Hiddink 
was normalised and naturalised: previous accusations of his lack of knowledge and concern with 
Korean society were replaced by articulations of the affectionate relationship between Hiddink 
and the Korean people, and pejorative descriptions of his foreignness were now excised.
229
 
 
“Uncle Hiddink, you helped the Korean team make the legend of the semi-finals:  
please stay in Korea until the next World Cup in Germany! 
 
Out of 1,700 children at Taegu’s Uksu Elementary School, some 900 wrote letters 
thanking Hiddink and sent them to the Korean Football Association by post. These 
letters were full of each child’s thanks for the World Cup, their passion for football, and 
their love of Hiddink and the players.”
230
 
 
In another example, a television program aired a section titled ‘I love Hiddink’, where the 
journalists openly expressed their admiration of the Dutchman: the female interviewer boasted of 
being given a short hug from Hiddink, upon which the other presenters gasped and screamed in 
jealousy.
231
  In effect, a Hiddink fandom was in operation, whose discourses of admiration and 
familiarity, combined with exhaustive details of his personal life and characteristics, engineered an 
erasure of distance and located him as a Korean ‘in spirit’.
232
 In addition, media attributed 
characteristics such as hard work, teamwork, self-sacrifice and bravery to the national team, and 
marked those qualities as quintessentially Korean. This allowed the Korean team’s success to be 
understood as the success of Korean values and ideologies. Hiddink could then be positioned not 
as the sole architect of this victory, but a crucial element in a collaborative victory that emerged 
from Korea’s inherent excellence. 
 
“We will never forget today, the day when football told us that Korea is something to 
be proud of, that Koreans can be proud of their achievement. It was not by luck that 
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Korean football had pushed aside Europe’s giants to reach the quarter-finals – it was 
ability. That’s why we can be proud, why we can cheer our hearts out... Trained by 
Hiddink, the Korean team’s fitness, fighting spirit and strategy had become world 
class... The players trusted in their manager, and the citizens [of Korea] trusted in their 
team.”
233
 
 
“Today, our players did us proud. In the eyes of the Portuguese players, they would 
have been small-time players from backwater leagues: but we were superior in not 
only ability, but organisation, and humiliated the Portuguese, who thought they were 
the best.”
234
 
 
“Rather than saying that Hiddink has created something new, I think it’s much more 
important to note that he was able to bring out our unique qualities and strengths. We 
ourselves were not able to identify these and bring these out, but he could, from an 
outside point of view.”
235
 
 
This kind of discourse anchored subjects in a familiar and reassuring ground that validated their 
own position as subjects and their passionate attachment to Korea. The media discourse asserted 
that Hiddink had not conferred on the Korean nation what it did not have or deserve, but merely 
enabled what was always not only possible but Korea's rightful place. Any potential contradiction 
between this assertion of superiority and celebration of Hiddink’s sŏnjin methods was foreclosed: 
Hiddink as a foreigner and his foreign influences had been firmly integrated into the grand 
narrative of Korean national triumph. The discursive normalisation of Hiddink had allowed him to 
function both as a vessel for Eastern Ways and Western Technology. In that sense, at least, Hiddink 
was as much ‘Korean’ as he was ‘European’. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting how precarious Hiddink’s status as hero was, and how fluid the 
discourses of Western superiority and Korean legitimacy were. The transformation of discourses 
involving two of Hiddink’s policies over 2001 and 2002 demonstrate how the very factors which 
were mobilised to villify Hiddink were eventually used to praise him and Korean nationality. Before 
the 2002 World Cup, the media had focused on criticising two of Hiddink’s policies – the prolonged 
period of experimentation and the refusal to announce a ‘best 11’ squad, and his insistence on 
physical fitness training. 
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“It’s pathetic... the hardest thing to understand is his training methods and use of 
players. It’s hard to understand why he insists on physical training when tactical 
organisation is so badly required, and why he used players that had not been tested on 
the domestic stage... there’s no more time to waste like this.”
236
 
 
Throughout 2001, the Chosun Ilbo fielded headlines such as “Korean football – tests, tests all 
day long”, and voiced expert opinion that fitness training was ‘ruining’ players.
237
 But when the 
national team began to win World Cup matches and perform well, the media was quick to 
applaud these policies, packaging them into elaborate terms, themselves connoting expertise 
and excellence: 
 
“[The Korean team,] armed with their ‘multi-player’ tactic which allowed every player 
to move freely across the field, drove the opposition into chaos... The answer [to 
success] lies in their tireless running and bold movement. The flexible use of players 
and the strict ‘power program’ training [Hiddink] had employed since last year are 
now yielding fruit.”
238
 
 
This shows that the discourses of Western superiority and Korean legitimacy would perform their 
productive roles regardless of the rise and fall of Guus Hiddink as an individual. The power of 
these entrenched discourses was such that Hiddink could only be a facilitator, albeit an 
extraordinary one. Hiddink did not herald a new era of global community and multiculturalism, as 
some Korean commentators enthused at the time: rather, the events surrounding his success 
contributed to a gradual shift towards a more confident Korean mentality in the face of Western 
normativity, but one still firmly within the discursive contexts of tongdo sŏgi-ron and the 
underdog. 
 
 
Both the public figure of Guus Hiddink and the concept of hospitality as a test of nationality were 
manifestations of the ways in which the Other, and perceptions of the Other, played an active role 
in determining how Korean nationality was articulated, defined and judged. Despite nationality’s 
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inevitable emphasis on its autonomous and sacred nature, it is the symbolic landscape of the 
global and globalisation that informs the frameworks and standards by which contemporary 
nationality is constructed and evaluated. In concert with the internal processes of affirmation 
exemplified by the Red Devils and the street supporters, the story of Hiddink shows that Korean 
nationality is just a part – if a central one – of a taxonomic system where standards of value, 
preference and normality are enacted and established through a public discourse that proclaims 
what Korea is and should become. 
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5. Towards Spectacular Nationality 
 
The Korean media coverage of the 2002 World Cup demonstrated the intimate relationship 
between media, spectacle and nationality in contemporary society, and the growing influence that 
commodity logic plays with regard to our understanding and experience of nationality. It is a 
relationship that continues to play out across other mega-events, such as the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics, and indeed on a daily basis in productive processes of banal nationalism. If nationality is 
a taxonomy of signifiers that continues to perform a normative, subjective function in society, 
then that taxonomy can be traced to the logic of commodity spectacle and the mechanisms of the 
mass media.  
 
The case of the Red Devils illuminates the processes by which the media spectacle can discursively 
generate internal affirmations of nationality. Through a series of consumer products that leverage 
national subjects’ passionate attachment to their nationality, the media appropriate and 
reproduce aspects of nationality in such a way that it reasserts nationality as a Foucaultian regime 
of truth and grid of intelligibility. This process calls on subjects to participate in a discursive 
production of their own nationality: in effect, it constitutes a large-scale, voluntary construction of 
a collective imaginary that provides the norms and values involved in subjection. At the same time, 
the media’s prominent position in that process inflects these discourses with a spectacular turn. 
The logic of the spectacle precipitates a transformation of nationality, from an inchoate yet sacred 
element into a series of consumable objects through which a sense of the sacred may be imparted. 
Media spectacles, therefore, must now be considered a key context within which nationality is 
produced and consumed. This pattern has repeated itself in the 2010 World Cup: the vuvuzela, an 
instrument of indeterminate origin, was made into a symbol of South African culture and 
commodified as an exotic national souvenir; meanwhile, the attention given to the theatrical 
antics of Diego Maradona, the Argentinean coach, exemplified the way spectacle is inherently 
drawn towards the dramatic and aesthetic. We are witnessing an ever more dominant governance 
by the logic of the spectacle, both over the field of sport and nationality as a system of signs. 
 
The case of Guus Hiddink and the Global demonstrated a double-sided gaze at work in the Korean 
media: it was a specific relationship between Korean nationality and the Global predicated on its 
antecedent positioning in a symbolic matrix of nationalities. While some aspects, such as the 
Korean idea of the sŏnjin’guk, are specific to Korean social conditions, the general relationship 
remains broadly applicable. Around the world, other nationalities act as linguistic and symbolic 
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reference points through which norms can be established in a given society. This Other can be 
simultaneously an object of condemnation through which the Self is validated, and an ideal by 
which the Self is pulled towards a revered norm. In other words, every nationality operates within 
a normative matrix of nationalities. The case of Hiddink also demonstrates how the flexibility of 
such discourse allows a resilient and persistent exercise of power. The media discourse negotiates 
the gap between the normative values of nationality in their abstract form and their practical 
manifestations (even as media discourse itself is one such manifestation). This means that while 
media discourse can and does challenge existing power relations, this capacity is itself a part of 
the ways in which the symbolic order of nationality can maintain its authoritative position as the 
interpretive schema for events and stories.   
 
 
In summary, the interaction between nationality and spectacle can be identified as a pseudo-
symbiotic relationship. On one hand, nationality derives social relevance by submitting itself to the 
spectacle: a familiar instance of this submission is the repackaging of traditional cultural forms, 
such as dance and painting, into popular entertainment in order to compete for prominence and 
cultural capital.
239
 In turn, media spectacle begets a sense of legitimacy and capital through its 
association with and apparent embodiment of ‘quintessential’ values and ideologies. This is a 
relationship which is transforming nationality’s structures of signification and production. I suggest 
that over the coming decades, nationality will increasingly be defined, challenged, consumed and 
played out through the simulations of media spectacles. Following Baudrillard’s law, these 
simulations are now in the process of becoming simulacra;
240
 in other words, they are 
transforming from a relationship in which media images refer to more traditional tropes and 
accounts of nationality and play on it, to a situation where one’s subjection to a nationality and 
understanding of other nationalities will refer to and derive from media images themselves. This 
transformation challenges the continued viability of an ‘authentic’ national subjectivity, or a 
subject that is grounded in the idea of one’s own nationality as a totality composed of one’s lived 
experience. In its place, the current forms of spectacular nationality hint at the emergence of 
consumption (of media, or rather the image) as the preeminent method for one’s constitution as a 
subject, the subject’s satisfaction of his/her passionate attachment, and finally the attribution of 
identity. 
241
 As processes of globalisation continue to transform our world, the relationship 
between spectacle and nationality will continue to develop. The economic conditions of the media 
as an industry, the aesthetic demands of the commodity market, the interplay between media and 
                                           
239
 See: G. Debord (1988 [1990]) pp50-1 
240
 See: J. Baudrillard (2001) p138, 142, 148-9 
241
 This contrast mirrors the transition from Erfahrung to Erlebnis in industrialising / urbanising societies, as 
identified by sociologists. See: K. Hetherington (2007) pp96-7. 
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consumer-subject at the level of discourse – these are the major factors that will determine the 
exact form of spectacular nationality and its social consequences in the years to come. 
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